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PAYDAY 
YONATHAN A. ARBEL* 
ABSTRACT 
Legislation lags behind technology all too often. While trillions of 
dollars are exchanged in online transactions—safely, cheaply, and 
instantaneously—workers still must wait two weeks to a month to receive 
payments from their employers. In the modern economy, workers are 
effectively lending money to their employers, as they wait for earned wages 
to be paid.  
The same worker who taps a credit card to pay for groceries in semi-
automated checkout lines depends on dated payroll systems that only 
transfer payments on a “payday.” Workers, especially those living 
paycheck-to-paycheck, are hard-pressed to meet their daily needs and turn 
to expensive, short-term credit products—notably, payday lenders. While 
the need for credit is a real one, credit providers charge a steep price, often 
culminating in endless debt spirals. So, why does the payday still exist?  
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This Article studies various explanations—economic, historical, 
behavioral, and legal. A primary conclusion is that the payday owes its 
existence to legacy legal architecture. That is, payday is a software 
problem, not a hardware problem. The hardware—i.e., money and payroll 
technology—is here. We can pay workers daily; in fact, gig economy 
workers in developing countries will often be paid more quickly than an 
American employee for the same work. What holds us back is our legal 
software: dated Eisenhower-era legislation that failed to anticipate 
technological change. Surprisingly, even pro-worker legislation, such as 
minimum wage laws, inadvertently encourages the practice.  
By revealing the overlooked and dated legal infrastructure that sustains 
the payday, this Article suggests a path for legal reform. Daily streams of 
payment to workers are feasible, practical, and far more efficient than most 
people realize. A focused reform could effectively bring an end to the 
puzzling and pernicious practice of having workers lend money to their 
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INTRODUCTION 
Legislation often lags behind technology. As Guido Calabresi observed, 
“laws are governing us that would not and could not be enacted today.”1 
This failure is resounding in the context of employment contracts. Payment 
technology has made incredible advances, and today trillions of dollars are 
traded in the online economy, moving between parties almost 
instantaneously.2  At the same time, workers still wait for weeks until a 
formal “payday” to receive their hard-earned wages. While workers sell 
their labor today, employers only pay them in the future, leveraging wages 
as another line of credit. 
 
1. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 2 (1982).  
2. At 14.2% CAGR, Online Payment Gateway Market Size Will Reach 3672.1 Million USD by 
2025, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 15, 2020, 9:02 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/press-release/at-142-
cagr-online-payment-gateway-market-size-will-reach-36721-million-usd-by-2025-2020-04-15 [https:// 
perma.cc/X4VP-9V7D]. 












We seem to take the payday’s existence for granted,3 but it exacts a 
heavy price. Workers who wait for payment need to support themselves; the 
vicissitudes of everyday life—a sudden toothache, a flat tire, a stain on their 
only clean work shirt—demand money, now.4 With many workers living 
paycheck-to-paycheck,5 the current payday system pushes them to payday 
lenders and other short-term credit providers that dot the modern urban 
landscape.6 A payday loan is meant to help the worker bridge the gap until 
payday, but it involves interest rates that are on average twenty times higher 
than those of credit cards.7 A $300 loan can quickly balloon into thousands 
of dollars of outstanding debt, leading many borrowers to debt spirals that 
can culminate in deep financial distress and even bankruptcy.8  
 
3. The modern literature has mostly neglected this question. This omission is perhaps most 
glaring in law and economics analyses of employment contracts, but it is by no means confined to these 
works. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (9th ed. 2014) (reviewing major 
topics but neglecting pay frequency); MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 420–21 (7th ed. 2011) (adumbrating pay frequency). But cf. JOHN R. COMMONS 
& JOHN B. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION 50–52 (1916) (noting the credit nature of the 
payday). 
4. The three leading reasons why individuals borrow from alternative lenders (such as payday 
lenders, pawn shops, and rent-to-own stores) are basic living expenses, making up for lost income, and 
house or car repairs. Neil Bhutta et al., Consumer Borrowing After Payday Loan Bans, 59 J.L. & ECON. 
225, 240 (2016); see also Rob Levy & Joshua Sledge, A Complex Portrait: An Examination of Small-
Dollar Credit Consumers, CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION 12 (Aug. 2012), https://www.fdic.gov/ne 
ws/conferences/consumersymposium/2012/A%20Complex%20Portrait.pdf [https://perma.cc/D78A-R 
LT3] (reporting that approximately 37% of very short-term borrowers borrowed because “[they] had a 
bill or payment due before [their] paycheck arrived.” In addition, 30% of respondents borrowed to meet 
some unexpected expense). This borrowing likely result from the payday; see also Nicholas Bianchi & 
Rob Levy, Know Your Borrower: The Four Need Cases of Small-Dollar Credit Consumers, CTR. FOR 
FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION 12 (Dec. 2013), https://s3.amazonaws.com/cfsi-innovation-files/wp-content/u 
ploads/2017/01/26054909/Know-Your-Borrower-The-Four-Need-Cases-of-Small-Dollar-Credit-Cons 
umers.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5AB-W4PG] (finding that 32% of consumers borrow because of 
misaligned cash flow and 32% to meet an unexcepted expense). Again, both reasons can be mitigated 
by regularized pay. 
5. 15% of households reported having spent more than they earned over the last year. Jesse 
Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2013 to 2016: Evidence from the Survey of 
Consumer Finances, 103 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 8 (2017).  
6. Paige Marta Skiba, Regulation of Payday Loans: Misguided?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1023, 1031 n.22 (2012) (“[P]ayday lenders outnumber both Starbucks and McDonalds.”). Roughly 64% 
of all adult Americans have at least one credit card and carry an average balance of $4800. In addition, 
roughly 50% of all credit card holders carry a revolving balance on which they pay interest. CONSUMER 
FIN. PROT. BUREAU, THE CONSUMER CREDIT CARD MARKET 46, 48 n.16, 56 (2017), https://files.consu 
merfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_consumer-credit-card-market-report_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9 
UA-TS3E]. 
7. Skiba, supra note 6, at 1027.  
8. See also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB DATA POINT: PAYDAY LENDING 4 (2014), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201403cfpbreportpayday-lending.pdf [https://perma.cc/KD2Y-YXJ 
7] (finding that 80% of payday loans are rolled over or followed by an additional loan and that 15% of 
loans are followed by a loan sequence of at least ten loans).  
To experience firsthand the process of obtaining a payday loan, I borrowed $200 from a payday 













This Article begins by framing the payday in the context of the 
employment contract. The employment relationship is, at its core, an 
exchange of money for labor.9 The payday also injects into this relationship 
a credit transaction, one where the employee is lending money to the 
employer. But this is a credit transaction that is completely artificial from 
the viewpoint of financial theory. Put simply, workers should not be in the 
business of lending money to their employers.10 Not only do workers lack 
capital or comparative specialization in lending, but they are also badly 
positioned to deal with counterparty risk. 11  A value-creating credit 
transaction moves money from those who have it to those who need it, not 
from the Walmart employee to Walmart. 
If the payday does not serve a clear financial purpose, what might explain 
its dogged persistence? This Article evaluates a variety of reasons: 
economic, sociological, historical, legislative, and even psychological. The 
primary conclusion is that the payday is a software problem, not a hardware 
problem. The hardware of the economy, both money and payroll 
technologies, has greatly advanced over the last century, allowing us to 
quickly and cheaply pay for both goods and services. To wit, a freelancer 
doing work in India for an American employer as part of the gig economy, 
who performs the same work as an American employee, will often be paid 
faster than the American counterpart.12 What hinders progress is our legal 
software:13 Eisenhower-era legislation that failed to keep pace with modern 
technology. In fact, as this Article reveals, the culprit is often pro-worker 
 
representing a 638.75% APR. Sociologist Lisa Sevron worked for a payday lender and reported her 
experiences in LISA SERVON, THE UNBANKING OF AMERICA: HOW THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS SURVIVES 
(2018).  
9. See, e.g., COMMONS & ANDREWS, supra note 3, at 2 (describing the employment contract as 
a “relation between a propertyless [sic] seller of himself, on the one hand, and a propertied buyer on the 
other.”). 
10. See infra Part I.B for a discussion of this point. 
11. Counterparty risk is defined as the “the likelihood or probability that one of those involved 
in a transaction might default on its contractual obligation.” Chris B. Murphy, Counterparty Risk, 
INVESTOPEDIA (May 14, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/counterpartyrisk.asp [https://per 
ma.cc/K7EA-AEUA]. 
12. In the online platform Upwork, hourly workers receive weekly pay five day afterwards (a 
12-day cycle). See Lena E., Faster Payouts for Hourly Contracts, UPWORK (May 5, 2020, 12:24 PM), 
https://community.upwork.com/t5/Announcements/Faster-payouts-for-hourly-contracts/m-p/739876 [h 
ttps://perma.cc/W8UL-7TQU]. Freelancer.com allows some contractors to withdraw payments within a 
single business day after verification. See Daily Withdrawal Requests, FREELANCER, https://www.freela 
ncer.com/support/freelancer/payments/daily-withdrawals [https://perma.cc/8PAN-DNP9]. 
13. Conceptualizing legislation as software is a productive metaphor and suggests a different 
paradigm to that envisioned in CALABRESI, supra note 1. Both legislation and software need to be 
updated to account for new circumstances and new information; both need to combine efforts of different 
groups, sometimes with different agendas; both worry about documentation of designer intent; and both 
face complex inter-dependencies. Software technology has created a number of interesting solutions to 
these problems that the legal literature is yet to address, such as alpha and beta versions, periodic updates, 
branches, and commits. See generally Git Theory, GITHUB, https://github.com/SCOREC/core/wiki/Git-
Theory [https://perma.cc/5GFU-2682].  












legislation, which stands in the way of progress, sometimes actively 
encouraging longer pay periods.14  
This Article’s central message is that abolishing the payday is desirable, 
efficient, and surprisingly feasible. To move to a system of daily pay, two 
challenges of legal origin must be overcome: compliance costs and payment 
costs. To assure compliance with legal norms, employers must verify 
payments—and doing so daily can be expensive. Transferring money to 
employees is also costly, given the sizable minority of workers who are 
unbanked and underbanked.15 How can we offer payments at scale without 
compromising compliance costs or burdening workers with check-cashing 
costs?  
To address these issues and others, the proposed framework offers to 
decouple compliance from pay.16 Every day, workers are to receive roughly 
93% of their daily pay, leaving some slack until a biweekly “accounting 
day.”17 On accounting day, the employer verifies compliance and makes 
true-up adjustments as needed. To address issues of money transfer, which 
are of particular concern for the unbanked and the underbanked, I explore 
the increasing use of digital money and payroll cards. This Article concludes 
that moving to daily streams of payment is both feasible and desirable, 
although it contemplates a transition period. By abolishing payday, we can 
spare employees the indignities of the payday, increase consumer liquidity, 
enhance worker autonomy, reduce the size of the payday lending industry, 
and improve the American economy as a whole.18 
This Article highlights the importance of regularly updating our legal 
software. Payday legislation started as a mode of progressive reform 
towards the end of the nineteenth century. Overcoming initial resistance 
from legislators and courts, payday laws were passed to discourage the 
predatory behavior of companies, which were lending to their employees at 
usurious rates. Remarkably, despite the poor money and payroll 
technologies that existed at the time, the legislation was effective, and for a 
short period of time, workers were paid weekly. By an ironic twist of fate, 
it is possibly the rise of the welfare state that led to the move from weekly 
to the much slower biweekly pay.19  The birth of the welfare state was 
 
14. See infra Sections II.A, F, G. 
15. I discuss the phenomena and problems of the unbanked and underbanked infra notes 202–
215 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra Part IV.  
17. For a discussion of the methodology behind this framework, see infra Part IV. 
18. For conceptual clarity, daily streams of payments are no longer payday in the conventional 
sense of a special day which aggregates pay for multiple days of work. 
19. There are various terms of art used to describe pay frequency. For expositional simplicity, 
this Article refers to payment modes that are more frequent than once a month and less frequent than 












spurred by the introduction of social security and social security taxes. The 
administrative burden occasioned by various related laws, such as the 
Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), the Federal Unemployment 
Tax Act (FUTA), the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and tax 
withholdings made frequent pay more difficult. Thus, the same laws that 
were meant to protect employees ended up harming them in an 
unanticipated way: by depressing the frequency of pay, they increased the 
need for expensive short-term credit solutions. 
This Article unfolds in four Parts. Part I sets the stage by explaining the 
tenuous relationship between employment contracts and the payday. Part II 
explores a variety of reasons for the existence of the payday and evaluates 
whether any counsels in favor of keeping this practice. Part III explains why 
the payday should be abolished and Part IV explains how this could be 
achieved in practice. 
To understand why the payday exists, Part I covers the basic theory of 
employment contracts. It explains why the payday is not a natural part of 
employment contracts and why, from a finance perspective, it is an artificial 
and inefficient credit transaction.  
If financial logic does not explain the existence of payday, what does? 
Part II explores a variety of potential reasons and justifications—historical, 
legal, economic, psychological, and sociological. Special attention is given 
to a psychological attempt to justify the payday: the idea that the payday 
helps employees overcome some of the behavioral challenges of saving and 
budgeting their own money.20 Refuting this idea is important because some 
might worry that moving to daily streams of payment would lead to 
profligacy among employees. To this end, I present empirical evidence that 
frequent pay does not increase spending. In fact, there is some reason to 
worry that infrequent pay may result in excessive spending, because of the 
higher availability of cash on hand. Most important, however, is the 
argument that employer-side savings are extremely risky, as they expose 
employees to opportunistic behavior, counterparty risk, and employer 
bankruptcy.21 To the extent that workers need help managing money, an 
insured, trusted financial institution provides a much more robust solution 
than postponing wages. 
Part II highlights one especially worrisome reason for the continued 
existence of the payday: ineffective legislation. For public sector 
employees, legislation often mandates by fiat long pay periods. The 
 
20. See, e.g., Christopher A. Parsons & Edward D. Van Wesep, The Timing of Pay, 109 J. FIN. 
ECON. 373 (2013). 
21. See also Shlomo Benartzi et al., The Law and Economics of Company Stock in 401(k) Plans, 
50 J.L. & ECON. 45, 46 (2007) (arguing that employees over-invest in their employers’ stock and that 
“investing a dollar in company stock . . . is often worth only 50 cents.”). 












President of the United States is paid, by law, on a monthly basis.22 In the 
private sector, badly drafted legislation also encourages late payments; in 
particular, and not without irony, wage and hour legislation unwittingly 
encourages long pay schedules. These defects, overlooked by employment 
law scholars and policymakers, have substantial consequences for the 
welfare of employees.23 
Understanding the sources of the payday allows the development of 
solutions. Part III first explains the large stakes involved in abolishing the 
payday. It then explains why abolishing the payday is imperative and why 
seemingly more moderate alternatives, such as advance payments, are 
insufficient and risky. It closes by examining the legislative changes that 
would be needed to abolish the payday.  
The key proposal here, developed in Part IV, is to move from biweekly 
pay to daily streams of payment of the good faith estimate of the employee’s 
daily pay. Every two weeks, the employer will have an “accounting day” 
and will add to the day’s pay any shortfall in payments. For the part of the 
workforce that is either unbanked or underbanked, payments can be made 
using pay cards and similar Fintech solutions. While there are some nuances 
and practical considerations in implementing this proposal, it is important 
to recognize at the outset that it does not derogate from the rights of either 
employees or employers. By contrast, adopting this proposal will greatly 
advance the welfare of all American employees and would also take a bite 
out of the large payday lending industry, increase worker autonomy, and 
correct some historical defects in legislation. In fact, implementing this 
proposal only requires modest changes to the legislative framework.24 
Even if one disagrees with any of the specific policy prescriptions, the 
key message of this Article is that the payday should not be taken as a 
neutral or natural fact of the modern economy. The existence of the payday 
has substantial consequences in terms of efficiency, distribution, and 
autonomy. While we live in an exceptional period with historically low-
interest rates, 25 the harms of the payday will only be amplified as interest 
 
22. 3 U.S.C. § 102 (2018); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (“The President shall, at stated Times, 
receive for his Services, a Compensation . . . .”). 
23. The Restatement of Employment Law defers to the employer’s choice regarding the payday. 
RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 3.01 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“Employees also have a right to be 
paid the compensation they have earned on a timely basis, usually in conformity with the employer's 
normal payroll practices.”). 
24. Pay frequency interacts in complex ways with a variety of workers’ rights and issues, such 
as wage theft, wage discrimination, and minimum wage. For example, frequent pay would expand 
workers’ ability to sue for equal-pay violations, as the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5 (2018) holds that every payment resets the 180-day statute of limitations. In general, frequent 
pay will tend to expand worker rights and, at the very least, will not derogate them.  
25. Federal Funds Rate—62 Year Historical Chart, MACROTRENDS, https://www.macrotrends.n 












rates rise. The recent outbreak of Covid-19 powerfully demonstrates the 
importance of liquidity. Many of the recent developments in Fintech suggest 
that the payday lives on borrowed time. It is perhaps time to call this loan. 
I. THE PAYDAY PUZZLE 
A. The Two Employment Contracts 
What is the purpose of an employment contract? Roughly 130 million 
Americans are considered employees and are thus parties to an employment 
contract.26 These contracts feature a great deal of variability, as they each 
stipulate different norms the employee must abide by—the employee’s 
various rights, benefits, and perquisites, as well as the employee’s duties, 
obligations, and loyalties. Still, at its core, the contract is premised on a very 
basic economic transaction: a “bargained-for exchange of labor for 
consideration.”27  The employment contract is an exchange relationship, 
which the parties seek to optimize according to their own circumstances.28 
This exchange transaction stands at the heart of the employment contract, 
and I denote it here as K1. In this K1, the employee is selling labor, broadly 
defined as time, skill, effort, and any other aspect of his or her human or 
social capital. In consideration, the employer gives the employee “money,” 
which could include wages, tips, perquisites, in-kind transfers, and any other 
value that redounds to the employee from the employer. When the 
employment contract describes the employee’s duties, it outlines the scope 
of labor that is exchanged. When the employment contract stipulates the 
employee’s pay and benefits, it states the payment that is exchanged for this 
labor. The concept of K1 is sufficiently capacious and abstract to capture all 
employment contracts, despite the fact that they differ in almost any other 
respect. In this high level of abstraction, we can say that K1 is responsible 
for the annual exchange of at least 6.4 trillion dollars.29 
 
26. BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION 
SURVEY (2019), https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat08.htm [https://perma.cc/5XN7-HFLA]. 
27. Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1992). 
28. PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY 4 (2005) (studying the 
optimal design of the exchange relationship). 
29. Based on the product of 130 million full time employees, BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., supra 
note 26, working fifty-two weeks per year and earning on average $956 per week, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATS., TABLE B-3: AVERAGE HOURLY AND WEEKLY EARNINGS OF ALL EMPLOYEES ON PRIVATE 
NONFARM PAYROLLS BY INDUSTRY SECTOR, SEASONALLY ADJUSTED (2020), https://www.bls.gov/new 
s.release/empsit.t19.htm [https://perma.cc/B5KW-GXYZ]. 












What both economists and lawyers will often miss is another striking 
regularity in modern employment contracts. Besides the K1 aspect of the 
transaction, most contracts also include a payday—a gap in time between 
the moment work is rendered and payment is transferred. Almost all 
payments by the employer are paid in arrears—that is, after the employee 
“gave” his or her labor to the employer. The following figure summarizes 
the frequency of the payday and the typical lag involved in payments, based 
on data made available by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the years 2014 
and 2019, and data available from the private payroll company, ADP, for 
2017: 
This figure summarizes pay frequency data, based on a very large sample 
of nonfarm employees.30 The chart shows that most American employees 
are paid twice a month, on either a biweekly or semimonthly basis.31 The 
difference between biweekly and semimonthly is fairly subtle: a biweekly 
 
30. Based on the product of 130 million full time employees, BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., supra 
note 26, working fifty-two weeks per year and earning on average $956 per week, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATS., TABLE B-3: AVERAGE HOURLY AND WEEKLY EARNINGS OF ALL EMPLOYEES ON PRIVATE 
NONFARM PAYROLLS BY INDUSTRY SECTOR, SEASONALLY ADJUSTED (2020), https://www.bls.gov/new 
s.release/empsit.t19.htm [https://perma.cc/B5KW-GXYZ] (farm workers were excluded from this 
study). The ADP data comes from a private payroll company, ADP, as reported in Tomaz Cajner et al., 
Using Payroll Processor Microdata to Measure Aggregate Labor Market Activity 44 (Bd. Of Governors 
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series 2018-005, 2018), https://doi.org/10.17016/FED 
S.2018.005 [https://perma.cc/LN9E-Y2AA]. 
31. Biweekly also denotes twice a week; however, in the wage payment context, it is used to 
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Figure 1 – Pay Frequency, US Private Businesses 












payday takes place every fourteen days, while a semimonthly payday takes 
place twice a month, on two separate days (e.g., the 1st and the 20th). Given 
the existence of fifty-two workweeks in a year, this means that a biweekly 
payday translates to either twenty-six or twenty-seven paydays per year, 
whereas a semimonthly payday entails a fixed number of twenty-four 
paydays. Beyond the twice-monthly pay, the figure also shows that a sizable 
minority of employees are paid weekly and a small minority on a monthly 
basis.32 
The existence of a payday may seem obvious—indeed, many take it for 
granted—but it hides significant complexity. The worker is providing work 
today: stacking the shelves, cleaning the floor, building a wall, attending to 
customers, etc. But for services rendered today, the employee is only paid 
in the future, on payday. In other words, wage and salary payments in the 
economy are, by and large, in arrears. 
Thus, the very idea of the payday implies a temporal distance between 
the moment the employee is providing services, the quid of K1, and the 
moment she is paid, the quo of K1. As noted by John Commons and John 
Andrews in their 1916 treatise on labor law: 
When the laborer starts to work for [the employer], he also becomes, 
for a time, a creditor. He contributes his services in advance of 
compensation. He is a temporary investor in the business. While he 
works he passes over to the employer the title to his product, and 
retains a claim for wages. When his wages are paid his investment is 
liquidated.33 
The economic classification of this aspect of the transaction is 
straightforward. When a person buys a car from the dealership, he or she 
can pay on the spot for the exchange. But he or she can also agree with the 
dealer to pay in the future, perhaps in monthly installments. This is the 
financing part of the exchange. By the same logic, when an employer 
receives services today but pays for them in the future, on payday, this is a 
credit transaction. In addition to the exchange relationship, what we called 
K1, the employment contract thus embodies a second credit transaction, 
what we might call K2. This K2 contains the agreement between the parties 
to defer payment for money earned until payday. The parties will not always 
explicitly set the payday in the contract, but of course, they agree to some 
kind of payday—and this part of the agreement, explicit or implicit, makes 
K2. As in any credit agreement, we can identify three parts: an employee-
lender, an employer-borrower, and wages-principal. 
 
32. The data collection methodology is not sufficiently clear to discern what share of American 
employees are paid on shorter time spans than weekly. 
33. COMMONS & ANDREWS, supra note 3, at 50.  












A natural question is whether this is a true credit transaction, as K2 does 
not seem to indicate any interest rates. This, however, should not be too 
distracting: credit transactions do not require explicit quotes of interest or 
even any interest at all to count as credit transactions. Consider how auto 
traders will sometimes offer “zero-interest financing.” The auto trader will 
not really offer a free loan but rather will build the cost of the loan into the 
price of the car. Some part of the price, then, can be seen as interest—the 
premium the dealer charges for offering “free” finance. And even if the 
trader charges no interest at all, it would still be a loan that would have to 
be repaid on pain of default and collection. That is to say, a loan is a loan 
even if it does not involve interest payments.34 
It may be tempting to try and define the problem away. If we were to 
define the unit of work as two weeks’ full of work, there wouldn’t be K2, 
because the payment is only due when the work-unit is completed. On 
reflection, however, such definitional games are unpersuasive. Defining 
work in two-weeks units is ad-hoc and does not map any underlying transfer 
of value. Effort, skill, and time do not come in two-weeks increments, 
rather, they are continuous. The worker’s daily expenses, as well, do not 
come in such neat packages. In fact, employers have attempted to redefine 
labor units; in one case, they sought to define work as a year’s full of work.35 
This way, employers hoped, they did not have to pay until the end of the 
year, and if the employee quits—or is encouraged to quit—before the end 
of the year, they could avoid the obligation to pay. For sound policy reasons, 
courts and legislators rejected this view. 36  More theoretically, if the 




34. Loans also have a maturity date; here, it is the payday. In a biweekly K2, the worker lends 
1/14 of the salary daily to the employer. The period until maturity shortens every day; at first, the loan 
is for thirteen days, but on the last day of work, the loan is only for that same day. On average, the 
maturity date is 6.5 days in the future and the loan is remade every two weeks. In a daily pay system, 
the loan matures on the same day it is paid, so it involves minimal interest, and so I do not explore here 
the possibility of hourly pay. 
35. Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481, 481, 485–86 (1834) (holding that, despite the employee 
quitting before the end of the stipulated year of work, the employer still had an obligation to pay under 
restitution); Matthew T. Bodie, Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO. L.J. 819, 840, n.133 
(2017) (“Modern wage payment schemes require that employees be paid . . . for all time worked, 
regardless of the length of term.”). 
36. See infra notes 124–132 and accompanying text. 
37. With independent contractors, it is sometimes the case that payment is made on a project-
completion basis (even though, even there, advances are common). Employment contracts, however, 














To quickly recap, so far we have considered the existence of two 
“contracts” implicit in the employment relationship: K1 and K2. K1 is the 
standard exchange of labor for money; K2 is the credit transaction whereby 
payments for K1 will only be made on payday. The K2 loan includes some 
“interest” payment in the form of higher than otherwise wages. With this in 
mind, we can turn our attention to how odd K2 appears from a financial 
perspective. 
B. The Puzzle of K2  
Finance theory teaches that, at the most fundamental level, loans create 
value by moving money from those who have it to those who need it.38 
Banks lend money to cash-strapped businesses, venture capitalists to 
promising entrepreneurs, and bondholders to growing companies. Such 
transactions create value because they are mutually advantageous. A loan 
enables the borrower to seize profitable investment opportunities and 
smooth consumption over time. At the same time, the loan also allows the 
lender to use its money as a source of profit, through interest payments. As 
long as the interest payment is between the value to the borrower and the 
cost of lending to the lender, the parties would find a credit transaction 
mutually advantageous. 
This basic logic of finance is well-recognized; however, applying it to 
employment contracts presents a puzzle. As we just saw, K2 is a ubiquitous 
part of the economy. It covers the Walmart employee stocking the shelves, 
the grocery store teller working the register, and the cook at McDonald’s 
flipping burgers; it covers employees from store clerks to university 
professors to executives. In all of these cases, K2 facilitates a loan from 
employees to employers—it is a loan from those with little money to those 
with more money. Why, then, is the Walmart employee lending money to 
Walmart? Why are service technicians lending money to Comcast? And 
why are police officers lending money to the government? 
It may be tempting to answer these questions with the same logic as any 
other financial transaction. Borrowers (employers) borrow because they 
benefit from having cash on hand and lenders (employees) lend because 
they profit from the interest payment. On reflection, however, the benefits 
to employers are vastly exceeded by costs to employees. The intuition is 
straightforward: households are in no position to lend money to firms. 
The benefit to employers from K2 loans is relatively small. One reason 
for that is that some employers do not even need cash. It is well-known that 
 
38. See generally Dan Bernhardt, Money and Loans, 56 REV. ECON. STUD. 89 (1989). 












no large American company pays employees daily. Yet we find firms like 
Alphabet which, despite holding $117 billion in cash, still uses K2 with its 
janitors, programmers, and marketers.39 Apple holds $100 billion in cash, 
and Microsoft lags with only $50 billion, yet both use the payday.40 The 
federal government is also not particularly cash hungry, and yet it mandates 
the use of a biweekly payday in all of its employment contracts.41 Even 
employees of the Federal Reserve—which quite literally prints money—are 
paid on a biweekly basis.42 This offers some evidence that the reason behind 
K2 is not liquidity. 
Still, many employers, especially small businesses, are not as cash rich 
as these companies, and they do stand to benefit from liquid funds. 
However, even for those employers, the benefit from K2 loans is smaller 
than first appears. To estimate the size of the benefit, consider the cost of 
borrowing from alternative lenders. After all, employers borrow from 
banks, capital markets, specialized lenders, and a variety of other sources. 
In 2019, for example, the weighted average interest rate on loans to small 
businesses ranged from 5.1% to 5.66%.43 If we use this rate to measure the 
gain the business receives from paying a typical employee in arrears, it 
becomes clear that the gain is fairly small. For an employee earning $50,000 
annually who is paid on a monthly basis, the annual payday credit benefit 
to the employer is only $108.44  
The benefit to employers is not large, but the cost to employees of 
lending money is significant. Employees are not in a position, nor do they 
have the skills, to lend money to their employers.45 Monitoring and secured 
credit, two common features of credit transactions, are all but absent in the 
 
39. Richard Waters, Google Parent Alphabet Overtakes Apple to Become New King of Cash, 
FIN. TIMES (July 31, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/332dd974-b349-11e9-8cb2-799a3a8cf37b. 
40. Id. 
41. 5 U.S.C. § 5504 (2018).  
42. Telephone Interview with Payroll Department, Fed. Reserve (Feb. 5, 2020). 
43. See FED. RES. BANK OF KAN. CITY, SECTION A: VOLUMES AND TERMS A.6 (2019), https://w 
ww.kansascityfed.org/~/media/files/publicat/research/indicatorsdata/smallbusiness/2019/sbls_aggregat
edatapdf_sept2019.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/N6TN-SEYB]. 
44. The calculation assumes daily compounding with 5% APR and the average salary in 2019 of 
$50,000. The calculation itself is not straightforward due to compounding, but it can be approximated 
in the following manner.  
$50,000 per annum implies a salary payment of $137 per day. At the beginning of the month, the 
employee has to wait roughly thirty days to be paid. On the last day of the month, however, the employee 
receives pay on the same day. On average, then, each payment is delayed by 15 days. 5% APR implies 
a daily interest rate of 0.014% (0.05/365). This means that the employee is lending every day of the year, 
on average, $137 for fifteen days at a rate of 0.014%. Overall, the value of this transaction is 
365*137*15*0.00014=105.01. (The difference between $105 and $108 is due to compounding). 
45. Most lenders will not lend absent a credit check and, where a large part of their portfolio is 
staked with a specific borrower, would require contractual controls. Neither of these characterize 












employee-employer relationship. And, of course, to lend money one needs 
liquid cash. But workers are often subject to severe liquidity constraints 
which make it very costly for them to offer loans to their employers. 40% 
of Americans with a credit card carry a credit card balance,46 and roughly 
16% of households reported essential expenses that are unmet, with 10.5% 
reporting unpaid utilities.47 In a survey, roughly 21% of households reported 
difficulty in accessing credit for their own needs.48  
Rather than being providers of cheap credit, households often turn to 
expensive credit products to finance daily expenses—such as payday 
lenders, credit card companies, advance tax refunds, and pawnshops—and 
the size of these industries illustrates the need felt by households.49 The cost 
of such borrowing is considerable. Congress estimated (quite crudely) that 
every late-paid dollar costs the employee an additional dollar—i.e., 100% 
cost of borrowing.50 However, the real costs tend to be even higher. When 
households borrow, they use a variety of sources, which include bank loans 
(with a ~10% cost of borrowing on average),51 credit cards (a 16% cost of 
borrowing),52 and payday lenders (typically 400%).53 For those households 
that use payday lending regularly, the finance costs can amount to a large 
percentage of their annual earnings. 
 
46. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 6, at 55. The bottom quartile of Americans had 
a median net worth of $200 in 2016. Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2013 
to 2016: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 103 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 17 (2017); Kathleen 
Elkins, Here’s How Much Money Americans Have in Savings at Every Income Level, CNBC MAKE IT 
(Oct. 11, 2018, 12:02 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/27/heres-how-much-mone y-americans-hav 
e-in-savings-at-every-income-level.html [https://perma.cc/Y4QV-BXDZ] (“29 percent of households 
have less than $1,000 in savings.”). 
47. JULIE SIEBENS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EXTENDED MEASURES OF WELL-BEING: LIVING 
CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011 11, Table 3 (2013), https://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/ 
p70-136.pdf [https://perma.cc/X87A-BK5C]. 
48. See Bricker et al., supra note 5, at 27 (2017); see also Matt Tatham, The Number of Americans 
with Bank Accounts Rises, EXPERIAN (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/re 
search/the-decline-of-the-unbanked-and-underbanked/ [https://perma.cc/C94N-8H6F] (In 2017, nearly 
20% of respondents were underbanked and 14.1 million adults had no bank account).  
49. In 2016, the revenue of short-term lenders (i.e., fee and interest payments) was $57.9 billion 
dollars. See ERIC WILSON & EVA WOLKOWITZ, CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, 2017 FINANCIALLY 
UNDERSERVED MARKET SIZE STUDY (2017), https://s3.amazonaws.com/cfsi-innovation-files-2018/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/27001546/2017-Market-Size-Report_FINAL_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/DV99-9 
9NA]. 
50. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2018) (“Any employer [in violation] . . . shall be liable to the employee 
. . . in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages . . . and in an additional equal amount as liquidated 
damages.”). 
51. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., CONSUMER CREDIT APRIL 2020 (2020), https 
://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/current/g19.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQY6-YHYV]. 
52. See Kelly Dilworth, Average Credit Card Interest Rates: Week of June 3, 2020, 
CREDITCARDS.COM (June 3, 2020), https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/rate-report.php [http 
s://perma.cc/P3QW-QLF5]. Timely payment of credit card balances would avoid these interest charges, 
but in practice, 47% of Americans carry a balance on their credit cards and so they pay interest on credit 
card purchases. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 6, at 55–56.  
53. What Is a Payday Loan?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (June 2, 2017), https://www.consu 
merfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-payday-loan-en-1567/ [https://perma.cc/TFE8-SSQ4]. 












The costs to households are not strictly financial. The liquidity crunch 
has broader effects on household welfare. Lack of access to funds is not 
only a financial issue; concerns with liquidity create financial stress, which 
is associated with higher mortality and worse health outcomes.54  
Judged in terms of the standard model of credit, K2 fails to produce social 
value. The cost of lending by the household far exceeds the benefits that 
accrue to the employers. True, larger employers would reap larger benefits, 
but the costs to employees would scale by a similar factor. And, to be sure, 
if the employer does not bear the full costs, the employer might not care 
about them and excessively engage in K2, even if it comes at a severe cost 
to the worker. I will return to the private incentive of employers later,55 but 
for now, the key point is that, from a social perspective, K2 destroys value 
because the costs of the loan exceed its benefits. We—society—want 
businesses to borrow using capital markets and lenders that can, more 
accurately, price and monitor risk. We do not want to create a line of credit 
which consists of employees’ wages. 
Importantly, K2 is not a one-off transaction, so value may be destroyed 
multiple times. It is not just that households need to bridge the first two 
weeks of employment; instead, K2 involves a continuous cycle of borrowing 
and repayment. Consider a hypothetical low-pay employee starting work on 
January 1, 2020, with only a small amount of cash on hand. The employee 
is paid biweekly and so has to borrow on January 1 against future earnings 
to support daily expenses. Come payday on January 15, the employee is 
paid and finally has cash on hand. But the employee also owes money. Now 
the employee has to repay the loan, plus interest, and make do with whatever 
is left. If the remainder is insufficient, the employee will have to borrow 
again. And again. And again. In the worst-case scenario, a debt spiral 




54. Todd H. Baker, FinTech Alternatives to Short-Term Small-Dollar Credit: Helping Low-
Income Working Families Escape the High-Cost Lending Trap 7–8 (Harvard Kennedy Sch., M-RCBG 
Associate Working Paper Series, No. 75, 2017), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/ 
mrcbg/files/75_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/YB4B-6FUA]. 
55. I return to this point infra Part II.C. 
56. A survey in England found that one in five payday borrowers were unable to repay the debt 
on time, leading to a debt cycle. Jill Insley, Payday Loan Borrowers ‘Trapped in Debt Spiral,’ THE 















Employment contracts include two key components, K1 and K2. K1 is the 
basic exchange of labor for capital. K2 is a credit transaction that is 
superimposed on the employment relationship. However, unlike K1, the 
credit transaction of K2 does not generate social value—from a financial 
perspective at least. The absence of financial logic presents the payday 
puzzle. Households are in no position to lend money to their employers, at 
least in the general case. Businesses have better access to liquidity, pay 
lower interest rates, and do not face the same pressures as individuals do 
when funds are running out. We shall now explore alternative, non-financial 
reasons for the existence of the payday, the topic of the next Part. 
II. PAYDAY: HISTORICAL, LEGAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC 
EXPLANATIONS 
The payday is a fixture of modern employment contracts. As Part I just 
demonstrated, however, there is nothing natural—from a financial 
perspective—in the modern matrimony between K1 and K2. If K2 serves any 
social function, it is not one that is rooted in financial logic. So what reasons 
could there be for the continued existence of the payday in today’s 
economy? 
In trying to answer this question, a broad range of possible reasons 
present themselves: historical, legal, social, and economic. My goal here is 
to examine and evaluate the leading reasons on the basis of two criteria: first 
as an explanation and then as a justification. This tracks the difference 
between understanding why a social practice exists and understanding 
whether it should persist. The explanation for why the train is late—the 
conductor is a late riser—is causally satisfactory, but it does not present a 
justification. Similarly, as we will see, many of the possible explanations 
for the payday fail as justifications.  
A. Path-Dependence 
Justice Holmes once observed that “[t]he life of the law has not been 
logic; it has been experience.”57 From keyboard layouts to tax legislation, 
path-dependence explains a variety of social arrangements.58 In these cases, 
past choices, justified by historical contingencies, continue to affect 
 
57. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
58. See generally Paul A. David, Path Dependence, Its Critics, and the Quest for ‘Historical 
Economics,’ in THE EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS: A CRITICAL READER 120 (Geoffrey M. 
Hodgson ed., 2007); Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Unintended Legislative Inertia, 55 GEO. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2020) (manuscript at 20–27), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1753389 (discussing 
the role of path dependence in tax legislation).  












decisions far into the future. Once adopted, too many social arrangements 
become dependent on past historical events, making the transition to an 
alternative system (even if superior) too costly.59 Consider, for example, 
how obsolete area codes are in phone numbers today; although they feel 
natural, logical, and perhaps inevitable for participants in the system, they 
are hard to explain to outsiders. In a similar manner, the payday may be yet 
another instance of inefficient social equilibria that results from path-
dependence. This conclusion becomes clear within a historical analysis that 
considers how the payday emerged in an environment with inferior money 
and payroll technologies. 
The first moral exhortation on the payday is in the Bible, where it is 
admonished that one should not “take advantage of a hired worker who is 
poor and needy . . . . Pay them their wages each day before sunset, because 
they are poor and are counting on it.”60  Whether daily pay was indeed 
broadly practiced in the old world with any regularity, though, is historically 
unclear.  
Moving to the modern era, under early English common law, employers 
were initially only required to pay within the pre-agreed pay period; in the 
absence of a specific agreement, the default was payment at the end of the 
contract.61 The old default presumably reflects the idea of piece-rate work, 
which was a common mode of employment in the eighteenth century.62 By 
contrast, if one counts certain agricultural workers, such as sharecroppers, 
as wage laborers, their pay was only seasonal. 63  Still, as early as the 
seventeenth century, we find growing indications of weekly and even daily 
wages in England.64  By the nineteenth century, wage work became the 
dominant form of payment and English workers were commonly paid on a 
weekly basis. 65  Across the pond, American workers in the nineteenth 
 
59. David, supra note 58, at 10–12.  
60. Deuteronomy 24:14–15; see also Leviticus 19:13 (“Do not hold back the wages of a hired 
worker overnight.”). 
61. ROBERT GILDERSLEEVE PATERSON, WAGE PAYMENT LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
68–69 (1918). The duration of the employment contract was imputed, in part, from the pay period. Jay 
M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 120–21 
(1976). For development of similar ideas in early American law, see id. at 125–26.  
62. E. P. Thompson, Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism, 38 PAST & PRESENT 56, 
78–79 (1967). 
63. See generally Joseph D. Reid, Jr., Sharecropping as an Understandable Market Response: 
The Post-Bellum South, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 106, 109–120 (1973). 
64. JAMES E. THOROLD ROGERS, SIX CENTURIES OF WORK AND WAGES: THE HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LABOUR 430 (1884), https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/rogers/sixcenturies.p 
df [https://perma.cc/552G-2LDU]; Peter H. Lindert & Jeffrey G. Williamson, English Workers’ Living 
Standards During the Industrial Revolution: A New Look, 36 ECON. HIST. REV. 1, 13 n.38 (1983); 
Jeremy Boulton, Wage Labour in Seventeenth-Century London, 49 ECON. HIST. REV. 268 (1996) (noting 
daily pay).  












century were also paid commonly on a wage basis, but it seems like factory 
workers and many other employees were only paid on a monthly basis.66  
As wage payment evolved in the nineteenth century, it faced a critical 
challenge; both payroll and money technologies were nascent and highly 
inefficient. 67  Taken for granted today, the use of a standard unit of 
currency—the federal U.S. dollar—was not always common in the early 
American republic, and the Supreme Court labored to encourage its use.68 
Monitoring hours worked and computing pay also proved challenging, 
especially if one has to compute withholdings, garnishments, benefits, and 
deductions for a large workforce. 69  And then there is the difficulty of 
disbursing pay—consider the illuminating complaint of a nineteenth-
century business owner: 
If the larger mills should pay once a week it would entail considerable 
more expense. The Pacific Company employs between five and six 
thousand hands, and it would be extremely difficult for the paymaster 
to visit all these people once a week, carrying his trunk up and down 
stairs, and taking receipts from each one. He has to go to the help so 
as not to stop the work.70  
These difficulties with cash and computation seem dated today, but they 
were of utter importance in the time when wage pay evolved. 
The evolution of the payday faced another formative moment towards 
the end of the nineteenth century. As part of a large movement of workers, 
wage and salary workers started organizing and lobbying for legislation that 
would mandate more frequent pay.71 Their efforts were initially met with 
strong resistance. Many legislators were unresponsive, and even when the 
legislature was responsive, courts were reluctant to approve pay frequency 
 
66. PATERSON, supra note 61, at 76–77 (noting the “custom of monthly wage payments which 
prevailed in most lines of industry prior to 1885”); ESTELLE M. STEWART & J. C. BOWEN, BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATS., HISTORY OF WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO 1928 77 (1934) 
(noting that in 1771 pay-per-product was abolished in the glass industry in favor of monthly pay). 
However, this source does not find any regular pay period across industries. See, e.g., id. at 90, 92; see 
also CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 275 
(1993) (citing M’Millan and M’Millan v. Vanderlip, 12 Johnson 165 (N.Y. 1815)).  
67. I turn to the technological issues infra Part II.G. In addition, wage work requires time 
technology—a watch—as emphasized by Thompson, supra note 62, and more conceptually, “the 
abstraction of a man's labour from both his person and the product of his work . . . . [and] a method of 
measuring the labour one has purchased, for purposes of payment, commonly by introducing a second 
abstraction, namely, labour-time.” MOSES I. FINLEY, THE ANCIENT ECONOMY 65 (1973). 
68. See generally SHARON ANN MURPHY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: HOW BANKING WORKED 
IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2017). 
69. See infra Part II.G. 
70. Esther Redmount et al., The Effect of Wage Payment Reform on Workers’ Labor Supply, 
Wages, and Welfare, 72 J. ECON. HIST. 1064, 1069 (2012).  
71. PATERSON, supra note 61, at 70. 












legislation.72 Such regulation was challenged as an unwarranted imposition 
on the parties’ freedom of contract and a due process violation.73  
The first large win for workers was in Massachusetts.74 The charismatic 
governor of Massachusetts, George D. Robinson, was a champion of regular 
pay. In the legislative hearing, he urged that a weekly payday be 
implemented for several reasons. The proposed law would increase worker 
autonomy, limit the scope of debt collection lawsuits, increase the use of 
cash (a major concern at the time),75 and instill a better sense of money 
management among employees.76 He also noted that the experience from 
voluntary weekly pay was favorable and thus refuted many of the chief 
concerns. Workers still saved and did not “waste their earnings in frequent 
debaucheries.”77 Indeed, even large employers found that the system was 
practicable and added few costs.78  
The weekly payday in Massachusetts signaled a national change. Reports 
on the enforcement of this law seem positive.79 Other states followed suit 
and adopted weekly or biweekly pay periods.80 Courts, too, changed their 
attitude and grew increasingly accepting of such provisions.81 One reason 
for this growing acceptance was the concern that employers use their 
bargaining power to offer unfair loans (advances) to employees.82 Another 
 
72. See LINDLEY D. CLARK & STANLEY J. TRACY, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LAWS 
RELATING TO PAYMENT OF WAGES 16–19 (1926), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/bl 
s/bls_0408_1926.pdf [https://perma.cc/MHS5-RU69]. 
73. See PATERSON, supra note 61, at 92–93 (documenting twelve cases where wage regulation 
was deemed unconstitutional and fourteen where it was also constitutional). 
74. PATERSON, supra note 61, at 70 (citing 1879 Mass. Acts 483); Redmount et al., supra note 
70, at 1064; see also PATERSON, supra note 61, at 68 (noting that wage period laws are “of comparatively 
recent origin.”). For the legislative history, see Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r of Labor & Indus., 
163 N.E.2d 19, 21 (Mass. 1959). 
75. See MURPHY, supra note 68, at 17–20. 
76. See George D. Robinson, Governor, Mass., Address of His Excellency George D. Robinson 
to the Two Branches of the Legislature of Massachusetts 33 (Jan. 3, 1884) (“[T]he lesson of economy 
be practically taught every day.”); see also id. at 36–38. 
77. Id. at 33–34.  
78. Id. at 34 (“It is, I submit, always wise and salutary to devise legislation of such a character 
as will reach the humblest and the poorest citizen, who has no voice but his own to present his needs,—
no power in combination with others to emphasize his opinions.”). 
79. KAN. DEP’T OF LAB. AND INDUS., THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR AND 
INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS (1888) 324–325 (“[A]ll of the corporations manufacturing or doing business in 
Massachusetts have cheerfully complied with the [weekly pay law].”). Reports from other parts of the 
country also appear positive; see e.g., STATE OF N.Y., SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FACTORY 
INSPECTORS, 45–46 (1893); Robinson, supra note 76, at 36–38.  
80. PATERSON, supra note 61, at 70–88. A few states adopted a monthly pay obligation. Id. at 
88–92. One example of weekly pay is 1891 R.I. Pub. Laws 38. 
81. Claudio J. Katz, Protective Labor Legislation in the Courts: Substantive Due Process and 
Fairness in the Progressive Era, 31 L. & HIST. REV. 275, 288 (2013). 
82. Steven L. Willborn, Indirect Threats to the Wages of Low-Income Workers: Garnishment 
and Payday Loans, 45 STETSON. L. REV. 35, 40 (2015); State v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 25 A. 246, 












was the concern that regular payment is “much more a matter of life and 
death to a workingman . . . than to the employing corporation.”83 Even the 
Supreme Court weighed in and held that states are well within their powers 
to regulate pay frequency legislation.84 This ruling came only nine years 
after Lochner,85 but it withstood Lochner era standards, as it was seen more 
as a form of preventing fraud and abuse than substantive regulation of the 
terms of the deal.86 
The boom in payday regulation was followed by a quick bust. As soon 
as 1916, most states had already moved to the modern system of biweekly 
pay.87 Massachusetts was the last bastion of weekly pay,88 but even there 
the practice has changed drastically. In 1959, the weekly pay law was still 
on the books, but many companies were paying biweekly.89 In a high-profile 
case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that weekly pay 
was still the norm,90 but the decision recognized that it was perhaps time for 
a change.91 Others criticized the decision for creating “unnecessary paper 
work . . . and add[ing] administrative burdens.” 92  Soon thereafter, the 
legislature changed the law to allow for biweekly pay.93  
Labor historian Nelson Lichtenstein proposed a more provocative 
explanation for the decline of weekly pay.94 In the 1930s, as part of the New 
Deal, President Franklin D. Roosevelt introduced the Federal Insurance 
Contributions Act (FICA) tax as part of the social security reform. In 1938, 
Congress introduced the minimum wage and the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA).95 Then, in 1943, Congress also introduced the payroll tax, which 
 
83. COMMONS & ANDREWS, supra note 3, at 51. 
84. Erie R.R. Co. v. Williams, 233 U.S. 685, 766 (1914). 
85. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  
86. See Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 547 (1923), overruled in part by W. 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (noting that “[i]n none of the statutes thus sustained was the 
liberty of [the parties] interfered with. Their tendency and purpose was to prevent unfair, and perhaps 
fraudulent, methods in the payment of wages . . . .”). See also David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era 
Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 
1, 9 (2003); David N. Mayer, Substantive Due Process Rediscovered: The Rise and Fall of Liberty of 
Contract, 60 MERCER L. REV. 563, 650 (2009).  
87. COMMONS & ANDREWS, supra note 3, at 51. 
88. Emilie Tavel, Companies Request Talk with State on Weekly Pay Ruling, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Dec. 23, 1959, at 2. 
89. Id. 
90. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r of Labor & Indus., 163 N.E.2d 19 (Mass. 1959). 
91. Id. at 22. (“Many good reasons may today exist for the payment of wages less often than 
weekly, including the greater financial responsibility of most employers, the payment of family 
obligations on a monthly basis or better family financial security than existed in years gone by.”). 
92. Emilie Tavel, Sparks Due on Law for Weekly Pay, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 18, 1959, 
at 1. 
93. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148 (2020). For the reforming act, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
133, § 502, approved July 20, 1992, and by § 599 made effective as of July 1, 1992. 
94. The Indicator from Planet Money: The Best Day for Payday, NPR (Oct., 30, 2018, 3:47 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/transcripts/662224497. 
95. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2018). 












required employers to withhold federal income tax from employees’ pay.96 
The result was an increased administrative load on employers who had to 
compute pay without computers.97 According to Lichtenstein, the effect of 
this legislation was to make weekly pay too expensive, leading to a push to 
move to biweekly pay.98 There is a bitter irony here, as legislation that is 
ostensibly pro-worker might have had this unanticipated adverse 
consequence on pay frequency. The same legislation that guarantees 
minimum wage, unemployment insurance, and Medicare may be 
inadvertently pushing employees into the hands of payday lenders and other 




Path-dependence may explain why we still have the payday today: we 
are relying on a century-old body of legislation that was optimized to deal 
with inferior money and payroll technology. Defaults tend to become sticky 
and even the presence of financial incentives to contract out of them may 
not be enough to overcome their viscid pull.99 Being the first-mover to break 
a social equilibrium carries risks and costs, and free-riding logic may result 
in inaction (consider, again, our dated system of area codes). However 
compelling as an explanation, path-dependence is only a weak justification 
for the continuation of this practice. Fin-de-siècle labor wars, concerns with 
scrip and truck, difficulties of computing wages by hand, and heavy coin 
chests carried among work sites are considerations that carry little weight 
in the age of modern payroll and money technology.100 
B. The Synchronization of Bills and the Payday 
Another potential reason for the continued existence of the payday is the 
seeming alignment of the timing of bill payments and the payday. Today, 
households pay most of their bills—utilities, rent, mortgage, internet, 
 
96. Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 68–120, 57 Stat. 126 (1943). 
97. For proportion, today, roughly 30% of the pay is made through “fringe benefits” which are 
often paid to third parties and require a more complex set of computations. BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., 
EMPLOYER COSTS FOR EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION HISTORICAL LISTING 50, Table 2 (2019), https://ww 
w.bls.gov/web/ecec/ececqrtn.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GDV-GVVT].  
98. Chris Hayes, The Breakdown: Why Are We Paid Every Two Weeks?, THE NATION (Jan. 21, 
2011), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/breakdown-why-are-we-paid-every-two-weeks/.  
99. See generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Common Law of Contract and the 
Default Rule Project, 102 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1566–69 (2016). 












phone, insurance payments, and so on—on a monthly basis.101 Monthly 
outlays place the payday into a larger social equilibrium, with both ingoing 
and outgoing money streams being closely tied together. Monthly bill 
payments, it is worth noting, are a somewhat recent historical 
development—a fact that played a role in the debates over longer pay 
periods.102  
The synchronization of bills and the payday appears, at first glance, 
harmonious; like clockwork, money comes in and goes out. But this is 
deceptive. Households pay bills for goods and services that they consume 
or use throughout the month. Whereas households consume daily, they only 
pay monthly.103 This means that the service provider is not only providing 
the service, but it is also providing credit: selling electricity today but 
receiving payment only at the end of the month. We see here K2 attaching 
again to a primary transaction, the sale of electricity, only this time around 
it is the household that borrows rather than lends. 
Economic logic dictates that utility providers charge for this service and 
for the risk of default. Households, however, are not the most reliable 
borrowers. Some households default on their utility payments, and the cost 
borne by all other households is greater for this reason.104 After all, the 
provider bears both the cost of not having access to their earned payments 
and the risk of default by the household. Hypothetically, out of every $150 
in the electric bill, perhaps $10 can be seen as interest. Exactly how much 
households today pay for this loan is not clear, but the overall economic 
effect is likely to be noticeable.105  
Consider, then, the situation from the individual’s perspective. Jane is 
working all month as a store clerk, but she is paid at the end of the month. 
Throughout the month, she needs to consume groceries, utilities, and other 
everyday expenses, but her employer will not pay her until the end of the 
month. For groceries, she uses her credit card—paying a few dozen dollars 
on her revolving balance. For utilities, she doesn’t need to borrow per se, 
but she is paying a higher price, perhaps a dozen more dollars. And while 
most of her daily expenses are financed by someone else, she is lending 
money to her employer. Somehow, on each transaction, she is on the losing 
 
101. See, e.g., Utility Bills, NEV. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, http://puc.nv.gov/FAQ/Utility_Bills/ [http 
s://perma.cc/H395-XYE8] (“Generally, meters are read monthly for electric, natural gas and water 
services, and monthly bills are generated for phone services.”). 
102. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r of Labor & Indus., 163 N.E.2d 19, 22 (Mass. 1959) 
(noting as a modern development “the payment of family obligations on a monthly basis.”). 
103. Technically, mortgage payments are in arrears, but rent is most often paid in advance. 
104. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., RESIDENTIAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION SURVEY (RECS) 
(2018), https://www.eia.gov/consumption/residential/data/2015/hc/php/hc11.1.php [https://perma.cc/3 
CWE-VUDT] (roughly 17% of all households received disconnect notices). The cost of default by some 
households is then spread to the bills of all other paying households. 
105. The savings from abolishing K2 will be split between the utility providers and the end-
consumer—but the exact split requires a more nuanced analysis of the market and tariff regulation. 












end. Being a risky borrower, Jane is paying a large amount to the utility 
company in implicit interest; being an unsophisticated, under-capitalized 
lender, Jane is receiving less in wage premium than her cost of borrowing.106 
Overall, households both borrow and lend, always on worse terms. 
Borrowing and lending do not offset each other; instead, they amplify each 
other, being two unnecessary and costly credit transactions. Rather than 
clockwork, bills and the payday are more like oarsmen—rowing in opposite 
directions, only to stay in place.107 As an explanation, the synchronization 
of bills and pay may make some sense, syncing income and expense. As a 
justification, however, it fails; there is no reason to preserve one for the 
other. If anything, it would be socially desirable to abolish both. On 
reflection, this synchronization seems to be contributing to the path-
dependent pull of historical considerations, making it all the more difficult 
to imagine breaking away from the biweekly pay convention—although it 
makes the case for abolishing the payday more compelling. 
C. Employer Power and Lack of Sophistication 
Another potential reason for the persistence of K2 is rooted in the unequal 
distribution of power and sophistication between employers and employees. 
If employers enjoy strong bargaining power, they may insist on K2 as a 
source of cheap credit. And if employees are unsophisticated, they may 
yield to such demands without negotiation, not realizing that K2 is 
essentially a credit transaction. 
In the standard economic model of wages, what determines wages is 
marginal productivity—how much value the employee is producing for the 
employer.108 A more productive worker would receive higher wages. In this 
model, one consistent idea is that of a wage premium or a “compensating 
wage differential.”109 If the employee produces some additional benefit to 
 
106. The loan from the utility company relieves some of the liquidity pressure of the household, 
but as explained, this is a form of (forced) credit that comes at a cost, albeit implicit in the price of 
utilities. 
107. The reasons for K2 in this context are likely to be distinctive from the ones in the employment 
context. It is possible that households prefer lump sums outlays because they allow for easier detection 
of overcharges or give them power in disputes vis-à-vis the company. This is a fertile area for future 
research. 
108. PIERRE CAHUC ET AL., LABOR ECONOMICS 82–83 (2d ed. 2014) (exploring, in the simple 
model of labor demand, optimal wages). 
109. The existence of wage premiums was consistently confirmed. See, e.g., Don Fullerton & 
Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Incidence 28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 8829, 2002), http 
s://www.nber.org/papers/w8829.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQE7-N5XH] (noting that the shared incidence 
of payroll taxes “has been tested and confirmed repeatedly.”); Jonathan Deslauriers et al., Estimating 













the employer beyond his direct labor output, the wage would be adjusted 
upwards to include a wage premium. That is, if the employee agrees to 
receive payment infrequently, the employer would be willing to pay a wage 
premium relative to an employee who is paid frequently. 
The size of the wage premium for payday, as well as its very existence, 
are empirical questions that received little attention.110 Some complicating 
factors are market failures, market organization, and regulation. Now, on 
theoretical grounds alone, it is clear that employers will not be willing to 
offer a wage premium that fully compensates the worker. To do so, the 
employer would have to pay them their costs of lending—but as we just 
saw, the costs to employees exceed the benefits to employers.111  
Still, if employers do not have to pay a full wage premium, they may use 
employee wages as a line of credit. To be able to extract such a benefit, 
employers must wield considerable bargaining power. And while it is clear 
that many employers do, in fact, wield such power (think of a single 
employer in a small town), this surely does not describe the entire economy. 
Outside of monopsonic employers, the distribution of power is far more 
heterogeneous. Even middle-class employees often find themselves in a 
position to negotiate portions of their salary and benefits, and firms invest 
considerably in the retention efforts of these employees. Yet, we do not find 
daily pay common even among these employees.112  
A deeper challenge to the asymmetric power explanation lies in the idea 
of effective pay. Even supposing that the employer can avoid paying a wage 
premium, the employer would find better and worse ways to exercise its 
bargaining power. Both the employer and the employee care about more 
than the per-hour wage; they care about the entire package of pay, benefits, 
work conditions, and duties—that is, they care about the effective wage. 
The more benefits the employer provides, the more costly it becomes to 
employ workers, even if the per-hour wage remains the same. 
 
Econ., IZA DP No. 11598, 2018), http://ftp.iza.org/dp11598.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VAY-L6Z4] (“The 
consensus is that [payroll] taxes are partially to completely shifted to workers, at least in the long run . . 
. .”). But see Emmanuel Saez et al., Payroll Taxes, Firm Behavior, and Rent Sharing: Evidence from a 
Young Workers’ Tax Cut in Sweden, 109 AM. ECON. REV. 1717, 1718 (2019) (finding firm-level 
differences in incidence and employment effects of payroll tax cuts). In other contexts, see, e.g., John 
M. Abowd & Orley Ashenfelter, Anticipated Unemployment, Temporary Layoffs, and Compensating 
Wage Differentials, in STUDIES IN LABOR MARKETS 141 (Sherwin Rosen ed., 1981) (premium for risk 
of layoffs); John R. Graham et al., Employee Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 25922, 2019) (bankruptcy risk). 
110. The one exception is Redmount et al., supra note 70, at 1066 who find that the 19th century 
reforms in Massachusetts resulted in lower average wages but increased hours of work, with a net 
positive effect on effective wages. 
111. See supra Part I.B. 
112. Parsons & Van Wesep, supra note 20, at 374 (showing that frequency of pay falls with 
income, so that middle and high-income workers are paid less frequently than low-income workers). 












Now, even for employers who wield enough power that they can 
unilaterally dictate the terms of employment, the choice of effective pay 
requires some balancing. Set too low, few workers would come to work and 
those who do would work fewer hours and leave at the first opportunity. 
The profit-maximizing employer would want to offer the minimal package 
of pay and benefits that still attracts enough workers. If the benefits are high, 
the employer can offer a somewhat lower wage and still attract enough 
workers; if the employer cuts benefits, it would likely have to offer more in 
the way of pay to attract the same number of employees. The following 
figure illustrates this basic tradeoff: 
As the Figure illustrates, paying more frequently allows the employer to 
pay less per-hour while maintaining the same effective wage. In designing 
the optimal mix, the employer would compare its own costs in providing 
frequent pay against the savings in direct wage payments.113 If it is indeed 
the case that the employee’s cost of infrequent pay is higher than the 
employer’s benefit, even the asymmetrical powered employer would tend 
to favor more frequent pay because it would allow it to reduce paid wages 
while maintaining the same effective pay that is needed to retain employees. 
 
113. The value of infrequent pay also includes savings on check-cutting costs and stronger 
leverage against the employee, issues that are analyzed infra Parts II.D and II.G. 













Thus, even a selfish, dominant employer who is committed to profit-
maximization may find it better to pay less but more frequently.  
While asymmetric power fails to explain the payday phenomenon in 
general, there is one area in which it provides a more cogent explanation: 
minimum wage employees.114 Potentially a design flaw, the minimum wage 
legislation does not consider effective pay, only nominal wages. Consider, 
an employer who—before the minimum wage—was paying $7 an hour and 
still attracting enough workers. Now suppose the legislator requires a 
minimum wage payment of $7.25 per hour. If the employer complies and 
pays more, the employee’s effective wage is raised above the market 
clearing equilibrium. The employer can offset that increase and reduce 
effective pay by paying less frequently, thus still keeping compliance with 
the letter (but not the spirit) of minimum wage law. Hence, there is a 
theoretical possibility that, in the presence of minimum wages, employers 
would seek longer payment periods. 115  This possibility has not been 
investigated in the voluminous literature on the effects of minimum wages 
and should be analyzed in future research, because it is very worrisome.116 
Minimum wage employees are also most likely to suffer low access to 
liquidity and improving their liquidity should be an important policy 
consideration.117 
As for lack of sophistication, it may have some explanatory power, but 
it does raise some questions. It may be that many employees lack the 
financial sophistication to properly classify K2 as a credit transaction. But 
what they lack in academic sophistication of this sort, they have in terms of 
skin-in-the-game. One does not need a degree in finance to understand that 
getting paid every day will make life easier than waiting a month to be paid. 
As workers viscerally feel the consequences of the payday, we would expect 
them to gravitate more toward employers who pay regularly. Indeed, one 
 
114. I emphasize that this is only a possible effect, as the literature on the effects of minimum 
wages is complex, nuanced, and hotly debated. Here I consider the classic wage model, noting that its 
applicability in different markets may be limited. See generally David Neumark, The Employment 
Effects of Minimum Wages: Some Questions We Need to Answer 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 23584, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w23584.pdf [https://perma.cc/KX9J-2U 
2R] (“[T]he debate among researchers about the employment effects of minimum wages remains intense 
and unsettled.”). 
115. There are limitations on the frequency of pay, as discussed infra Part II.F. 
116. There is empirical evidence that employers sometimes cut fringe benefits in response to 
higher minimum wages. Jeffrey Clemens et al., The Minimum Wage, Fringe Benefits, and Worker 
Welfare, 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24635, 2018), https://www.nber.org/pa 
pers/w24635.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HGY-ETMK]. 
117. See, e.g., Jonathan Morduch, Poverty and Vulnerability, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 221, 221 (1994) 
(noting “the reasonably universal phenomenon by which the lack of collateral limits borrowing by the 
poor in bad times”). 












consequence of the Covid-19 pandemic is the increased demand for daily 
pay.118  
Overall, employers’ market power and employees’ lack of sophistication 
may explain some part of the practice of payday, although it seems 
unpersuasive as a general explanation—especially given the fact that we 
find prolonged payment periods even among higher-paid employees.119 As 
a justification, however, both reasons fail. Both information gaps and 
market monopolies are types of market failures—and there is little appeal 
to market outcomes that result from market failures. 
D. Collateral 
A different reason for the existence of the payday grounds the practice 
in the need of employers to retain their employees. Employers worry that 
employees may decide to quit midstream, leaving the employer stranded 
without the personnel or skill necessary to produce their products or serve 
their clientele. Contract law can protect employers against this possibility—
they can require the employee give notice. But such protection is quite 
weak, as employees can be judgment proof and the cost of litigation can be 
prohibitive.120 Postponing pay thus creates collateral and, with it, leverage; 
if the employee disappears, the employer may threaten to expropriate this 
collateral.121 
As an explanation, the idea of collateral faces a challenge in explaining 
why the payday is used even when there is little flight risk or when 
employees are not judgment proof. Indeed, the average worker stays with 
his or her employer for at least four years. 122  It may still be true that 
employers are reluctant to sue employees for reputational reasons, rendering 
 
118. See Ellen Sheng, Companies Offer Cash-Strapped Employees Daily Pay Cards and Other 
Flex-Pay Options as a Lifeline, CNBC (Mar. 30, 2020, 8:47 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/30/co 
mpanies-offer-cash-strapped-employees-daily-pay-cards-as-a-lifeline.html [https://perma.cc/NH5H-B 
ADW]. As this Article was in edits in the midst of the pandemic, it is too early to determine its long-
term labor market effects. 
119. Matt Burgess, How Frequently Do Private Businesses Pay Workers?, 3 BEYOND THE 
NUMBERS 1, 5–6 (2014) (reporting that, in 2013, average hourly pay for semimonthly and monthly pay 
was “slightly less than $30 an hour”; biweekly “slightly less than $25”; and weekly “slightly less than 
$20”). 
120. See, e.g., 80 Fed. Reg. 62,958, 62,985 (Oct. 16, 2015) (to be codified at C.F.R. pt. 655) 
(Private employers asking, in the context of new rules on commissions, “that DOL permit employers to 
withhold a portion of wages as an incentive for the employee to complete the contract period and to 
discourage workers from leaving to work in other industries.”). A deeper problem is strategic judgment 
proofing through asset shielding. See generally Yonathan A. Arbel, Shielding of Assets and Lending 
Contracts, 48 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 26 (2016).  
121.  On the historical use of collateral, see Redmount et al., supra note 70, at 1065.  
122. BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., EMPLOYEE TENURE IN 2018 1 (2018), https://www.bls.gov/news 












the employment contract unprotective of the employer’s interests. But the 
same logic, the same concern with reputational effects, would also lead 
employers to avoid sequestering the collateral.123 In any case, collateral 
offers a plausible explanation for some of the practices of payday. As a 
justification, however, things are more complicated. 
As a society, we decided that employers should not be allowed to 
sequester earned wages, even when the employee quits. Employers are 
legally prohibited from taking earned wages in retaliation for the worker 
quitting. 124  A large number of jurisdictions have enacted “final pay 
statutes,” which compel the payment of all unpaid wages upon termination, 
or soon thereafter.125 Final pay statutes are often accompanied by penalties 
and fee-shifting provisions to further compel employers to make timely 
payments. 126  State courts have likewise recognized the public policy 
imperative in favor of prompt payment. 127  The policy underlying these 
statutes is widely endorsed: the Supreme Court held that legislation 
requiring prompt payment upon discharge—i.e., payment without 
“abatement or deduction”—is constitutional.128 The Department of Labor 
denounced any pay practices that have the effect of payment deferral.129 In 
some jurisdictions, courts adhere to the “faithless servant” doctrine, which 
denies employees any pay (even in quantum meruit) if they are disloyal to 
their employers.130 However, disloyalty is generally understood to mean 
unlawful competition with the employer or perhaps dissemination of trade 
secrets.131 This doctrine is of little relevance, then, to employees who quit 
midstream.132 
While collateral fails as a justification for withholding earned wages, it 
does provide justification to a subtly different issue—not the existence of 
payday but why payday is always in arrears. The reason that employers do 
not prepay employees is clearly rooted in the difficulty of recovering 
 
123. Reputational concerns may indeed push the employer to sue and sequester the collateral to 
develop a reputation for “toughness.”  
124. See, e.g., Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481, 489–92 (1834) (establishing the duty to pay an 
employee for part performance); Pineda v. Bank of Am., 241 P.3d 870, 877 (Cal. 2010).  
125. William C. Martucci & Jennifer K. Oldvader, Avoiding Another Wage-and-Hour Pitfall: 
State Late-Paycheck Laws, 38 EMP. REL. TODAY 71 (2011). 
126. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 23.05.140(d) (West 2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 
1103(b) (West 2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-29(A)(2), (F) (West 2019). 
127. See, e.g., Pineda, 241 P.3d at 877 (“[T]he public policy in favor of full and prompt payment 
of an employee's earned wages is fundamental and well established . . . .”) (quoting Smith, 137 P.3d at 
220). 
128. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Paul, 173 U.S. 404 (1899).  
129. See, e.g., 80 Fed. Reg. 62,957, 62985-86 (Oct. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 655). 
130. See Charles A. Sullivan, Mastering the Faithless Servant?: Reconciling Employment Law, 
Contract Law, and Fiduciary Duty, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 777, 779 (2011). 
131. See Alan Hyde, What Should the Proposed Restatement of Employment Law Say About 
Remedies?, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 497, 508 (2012). 
132. See STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 609–12 (4th 
ed. 2007).  












unearned wages from an employee who absconds. Anticipating this 
difficulty in recovery, some workers may want to assume positions just for 
the sake of prepayments, making the hiring process difficult and costly. 
Hence, “reverse” K2, where the employer lends money to the employee, is 
not a general solution—a point worth remembering as we move to the 
normative discussion. 
 Overall, collateral may explain the practice of payday to some extent 
and may justify the absence of “reverse K2,” but it fails to justify K2 as a 
social practice. Employers, we have decided as a society, should not 
sequester earned wages.  
E. Behavioral Biases 
The reasons discussed so far were mostly concentrated on the employer. 
Another potential reason for the existence of the payday comes from the 
employees and their own well-being. While the question of the payday was 
mostly neglected in the legal literature,133 economists Parsons and Van-
Wesep recently published a theoretical explanation of the payday in the 
leading Journal of Financial Economics.134 This explanation is rooted in 
psychology and suggests that the payday helps employees address their 
biases. While this account rests on familiar intuitions, I believe it fails both 
as an explanation and as a justification for the existence of the payday. 
The idea goes as follows: people find it difficult to budget and control 
their expenses. When employers pay frequently, individuals are more likely 
to spend the money in their pockets due to behavioral biases such as 
“present-bias” that prevent them from considering the full, long-term 
implications of their behavior. The same way as some of us would benefit 
from a pizzeria that would only sell us a few slices, employees are said to 
benefit from having infrequent pay. Under this account, employers are 
delaying payments as a service to employees, sparing employees from their 
weak impulse control.135 
This theory is not without evidence. The basic proposition—that 
households need help budgeting money—is consistent with some evidence 
showing that the timing of payments influences household money 
management. One study showed that pension recipients consume the fewest 
calories the week before the benefits are paid, perhaps suggesting a 
 
133. See supra note 3. 
134. Parsons & Van Wesep, supra note 20. 












difficulty in saving evenly across the entire pay period.136 Similarly, another 
study showed that individuals make the most of their food and necessity 
purchases right after receiving benefit payments. 137  The authors and 
economists  Parsons and Van Wesep further argue that their findings are 
consistent with the fact that low-paid employees are paid more frequently 
than higher-paid employees. 138 To them, this is simply the result of low-
paid employees being more presently-biased than their wealthier 
counterparts and lacking a financial buffer, making their need for money 
exceed their desire to save.139 
There is no doubt that saving money can be difficult, but this point should 
not be taken to mean that workers need their employers to help them save. 
If that were the case, we would expect to see at least some workers asking 
their employers to delay payments—so this dog doesn’t bark. More 
generally, this behavioral explanation fails, both on theoretical and 
empirical grounds. 
First, consider how behavioral biases may work in this context in the 
exact opposite direction. By waiting until payday, employees receive a 
larger paycheck than they would if they were to be paid on an ongoing basis. 
This large payment can create a sense of windfall—a “full wallet” bias.140 
This behavioral bias may lead individuals to spend more on luxuries than 
when individuals operate under a sense of scarcity. Indeed, the concern with 
the full wallet bias was precisely the reason some legislators enacted 
frequent pay legislation: “[large payments] could mean . . . dissipation on 
payday of a large part of the accumulated sums by irresponsible employees 
 
136. Giovanni Mastrobuoni & Matthew Weinberg, Heterogeneity in Intra-Monthly Consumption 
Patterns, Self-Control, and Savings at Retirement, 1 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 163, 164 (2009); see 
also Jani-Petri Laamanen et al., Once or Twice a Month? The Impact of Payment Frequency on 
Consumption Patterns (Feb. 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/794a/c54 
611eeff7bd40efa93729cada5e0e03fa5.pdf [https://perma.cc/24ND-DYMA].  
137. Melvin Stephens Jr., “3rd of tha Month”: Do Social Security Recipients Smooth 
Consumption Between Checks?, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 406 (2003). 
138. Parsons & Van Wesep, supra note 20, at 389 (“Insofar as education and wealth correlate 
negatively with time-inconsistency, more educated and more wealthy workers should be, and are 
empirically, paid less frequently.”). 
139. Id.  
140. See Carlos Dobkin & Steven Puller, The Effects of Government Transfers on Monthly Cycles 
in Drug Abuse, Hospitalization and Mortality, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 2137, 2143 (2007) (Reviewing research 
on the full wallet effect). See also Hal R. Arkes et al., The Psychology of Windfall Gains, 59 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 331 (1994) (finding higher propensity to 
spend money viewed as a windfall); C. Yiwei Zhang & Abigail B. Sussman, The Role of Mental 
Accounting in Household Spending and Investing Decisions, in CLIENT PSYCHOLOGY 65, 69 (Charles 
R. Chaffin ed., 2018) (noting the evidence of a higher propensity to spend windfalls on luxury items). 
Such debates are not new; in nineteenth-century Massachusetts, mill owners thought that moving to 
weekly pay would lead to more employee intoxication, but “our treasurer determined to give it a fair 
trial and the result exceeded our anticipations, for we found that instead of increasing drunkenness, it 
has had a contrary effect, so far as we could ascertain by the working days of our operatives.” Redmount 
et al., supra note 70, at 1069–70.  












with consequent adverse effect on family and community.”141 Empirical 
evidence suggests that this concern is not only theoretical. For example, 
research shows that individuals consider tax refunds to be “extra” money, 
leading them to spend it more easily than their “regular” money. 142 
Similarly, when benefits are paid in a lump sum, one finds a spike in drug 
use, hospitalization, and mortality—as some individuals purchase excess 
drugs and alcohol.143 One recent report notes a spike in child abuse on 
payday, as adults engage in excessive drinking.144 Another study compared 
the expenditure profile of benefits recipients who receive payment twice a 
month with those who receive a larger payment once a month. 145 It found 
that the single payment leads to high within-month variability, with most of 
the money spent early, thus concluding that “two temporally separate 
payments might lead to smoother spending than just one payment.”146 It is 
also possible that it is easier to save pennies than dollars, which is the 
business model of a few recent start-ups.147  
Second, to explain why low-income workers are paid more regularly 
than higher-income workers, Parsons and Van Wesep posit that low-paid 
 
141. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r of Labor & Indus., 163 N.E.2d 19, 21 (Mass. 1959); see 
also Rebekah D. Provost, Punishing and Deterring the Unknowing: Mandatory Treble Damages Under 
the Massachusetts Wage Act, 18 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 305, 311 (2013). Payday was a 
special occasion in turn of the century America, when mostly men engaged in communal binge drinking, 
spending a large portion of their payday wages. See also MADELON POWERS, FACES ALONG THE BAR: 
LORE AND ORDER IN THE WORKINGMAN’S SALOON, 1870–1920 52–53 (1998); COMMONS & ANDREWS, 
supra note 3, at 52 (noting that some states had special legislation mandating payment during pay hours, 
to avoid the payment bar-rooms). In contrast, some legislators expressed concern that too-frequent pay 
would lead to “frequent debaucheries.” See Robinson, supra note 76, at 33.  
142. See William Adams, Liran Einav & Jonathan Levin, Liquidity Constraints and Imperfect 
Information in Subprime Lending, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 49, 49–50 (2009) (finding a sharp increase in 
auto purchases in the subprime market during tax refund season); Brian Baugh et al., Disentangling 
Financial Constraints, Precautionary Savings, and Myopia: Household Behavior Surrounding Federal 
Tax Returns 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19783, 2014), https://www.nber.org 
/papers/w19783.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7C2-T32H] (finding a large temporary increase in expenses 
following tax refunds, which is interpreted as suggesting myopic behavior).  
143. Dobkin & Puller, supra note 140, at 2140 (“This evidence strongly suggests a causal 
relationship between cash aid and the cycle in drug related hospitalizations . . . .”). 
144. Martin Selsoe Sorensen, Greenland Calls on Denmark to Help Fight Child Sexual Abuse, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/27/world/europe/greenland-sexual-abu 
se-tasiilaq-denmark.html [https://perma.cc/AFM8-XVUP] (“Pay days are the worst time for the children 
of Tasiilaq . . . . With their salaries or social benefits in hand, many adults tend to drink and parents 
become too inebriated to look after their children . . . . So on the last Friday of every month, officials 
open a sports hall in the district as a shelter to keep children away from sexual abuse.”). 
145. Laamanen et al., supra note 136, at 4. 
146. Id. at 20. 
147. See, e.g., ACORNS, https://www.acorns.com/ [https://perma.cc/MR26-Y7GY] (a micro-
investing platform with corresponding app that allows customers to invest spare change into an 
aggregated portfolio managed by industry professionals). To be clear, I do not consider the windfall bias 













workers are more prone to present-bias.148 How likely is this assumption? 
Are middle-income employees necessarily more money conscious and less 
likely to overspend than their paycheck-to-paycheck counterparts?149 And 
even if that were the case, low-paid employees are hardly a homogenous or 
static group. A large body of research documents earning mobility, 
suggesting that many (but of course, not all) employees are on their path to 
higher earnings in the future—think interns, students working a side job, or 
a manager-track employee working the ranks.150 A dynamic view of low-
wage employees renders such broad generalizations unpersuasive.  
Third, there is a subtle legal point that belies this explanation. The entire 
utility of delayed pay is undermined if employees can ask employers to 
advance their wages—and if employees are indeed present-biased, they 
would be expected to do so. The authors themselves admit that wage 
advances “will cause our results thus far to unravel, implying a need for 
regulation.” 151  They argue, however, that the law prevents advances 
because “regulators in 45 U.S. states require wages to be paid at a minimum 
frequency.” 152  This is, however, not entirely correct. Pay frequency 
legislation does not require minimum pay frequency (but a maximum) and 
does not bar wage advances.153 If workers are indeed blinded by present-
bias, they could and would use wage advances to squander their pay. 
The last problem with this explanation is that it overstates the difficulty 
of saving money. In practice, over 55% of households have liquid assets at 
their disposal, which they manage to save by themselves.154 There is also 
some evidence that pay frequency does not affect savings rates; a recent 
study concludes that “pay frequency does not affect household’s savings” 
and that the amount of money that households spend over the month has no 
 
148. Parsons & Van Wesep, supra note 20, at 389 (“Insofar as education and wealth correlate 
negatively with time-inconsistency, more educated and more wealthy workers should be, and are 
empirically, paid less frequently.”). 
 At least in the aggregate data presented by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the correlation between 
pay and pay frequency breaks if one excludes weekly paid employees—in fact, semi-monthly paid 
employees are paid somewhat more than monthly-paid employees. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., 
supra note 29. 
149. Economists are divided on these questions. See Leandro Carvalho, Poverty and Time 
Preference 2–3 (RAND Labor & Population, Working Paper No. WR-759, 2010), https://www.rand.org/ 
content/dam/rand/pubs/workingpapers/2010/RANDWR759.pdf [https://perma.cc/CC65-V63F].  
150. See, e.g., Katharine Bradbury, Levels and Trends in the Income Mobility of U.S. Families, 
1977–2012 2, 21 n. 21 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. 16-8, 2016) (“[F]or those starting 
poor, an average of 58 percent moved out of the poorest group . . . .”). 
151. Parsons & Van Wesep, supra note 20, at 382. 
152. Id. 
153. See Jim Hawkins, Earned Wage Access and the End of Payday Lending, B.U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 32) (on file with author) (“Currently, no states specifically regulate 
[earned wage advance] transactions . . . .”). 
154. See Bricker et al., supra note 5, at 17. Conditional on having financial assets, the median 
family held $23,500 in assets. Id. at 18. 












relation to the frequency of pay. 155  Indeed, if this explanation were 
persuasive, we might expect to see workers asking their employers to delay 
payments, so they can save better—but of course, such behavior is rarely 
observed.  
Overall, then, while the inability to save may explain a portion of the 
payday phenomenon, it fails as a general explanation. However, I want to 
make a stronger claim; present-bias also fails as a justification for the 
payday. To show this, I would like to take a step back from the question of 
whether employees need help saving and focus on the question of whether 
employers should be the ones who help them save. 
The core of the problem is simple: employers are unreliable agents for 
the management of employee savings.156 There is a reason why pension 
funds, such as 401(k)s, are not owned by employers.157 Employers are not 
some neutral bank; in practice, wage theft—the withholding of pay due—is 
“rampant in the low-wage workforce.”158 Employers (and the government 
is no exception) sometimes unilaterally suspend pay.159 Moreover, keeping 
money with one’s employer also gives the employer leverage, and the 
employer may abuse it.160 Worse, unlike banks, employers are not insured 
against bankruptcy.161 Thus, using employers as vaults not only exposes 
employees to abuse but also to the risk of bankruptcy, a risk over which the 
employee has little control. 162  Bankruptcy risk also exposes another 
 
155. Inés Berniell, Pay Cycles: Individual and Aggregate Effects of Paycheck Frequency 19 (Apr. 
2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://inesberniell.weebly.com/uploads/9/1/2/2/91228902/paycycles 
_berniellines.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FH2-LGJ9].  
156. A key component of prudent financial planning is diversification. Tying one’s money with 
one’s place of employment is the opposite of diversification. See, e.g., Sarah O’Brien, Don’t Overlook 
the Risk that Comes with Your Employee Stock Options, CNBC (Feb., 27, 2018, 11:57 AM), https://www 
.cnbc.com/2018/02/27/employee-stock-options-can-come-with-expensive-risks.html [https://perma.cc/ 
8SG4-3L4M]. 
157. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) was enacted to minimize 
“the looting and mismanagement that had previously plagued private pensions” by borrowing a trust law 
model. Natalya Shnitser, Trusts No More: Rethinking the Regulation of Retirement Savings in the United 
States, 2016 BYU L. REV. 629, 642.  
158. Llezlie L. Green, Wage Theft in Lawless Courts, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1303, 1309 (2019); see 
also IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS/INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, SETON HALL UNIV., ALL WORK AND NO 
PAY: DAY LABORERS, WAGE THEFT, AND WORKPLACE JUSTICE IN NEW JERSEY (2011), https://www.im 
migrationresearch.org/report/seton-hall-university-school-law/all-work-and-no-pay-day-laborers-wage 
-theft-and-workplace-ju [https://perma.cc/3MHZ-S5H7].  
159. The concern with suspended government pay is longstanding. See, e.g., Payless Payday, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1949, at 10 (noting that “[y]ear after year, Federal employes [sic] face 
suspensions of income”).  
160. See supra Part II.D. 
161. The Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, Pub. L. 81–797, 64 Stat. 873 (codified at 12 
U.S.C. § 1823(e) (2018)). 
162. Aside from bankruptcy, letting the employer control more money provides it with leverage 
which it can use against the employee in various ways, making quitting, for example, more difficult. 












problem with employer-side saving. Employers, after all, are also humans 
and are inherently not immune to the same present bias that would lead 
employees to squander money. The manager may be tempted to spend the 
money on a new machine, a shiny business opportunity, or a private car, not 
leaving enough slack to pay wages. 163  Given these problems, even if 
employees are subject to a severe present-bias, having employers manage 
savings is counter-productive. At the very least, employees would benefit 
from having reliable, insured third parties manage their savings (such as 
their 401(k) retirement accounts), rather than having their bankruptcy-prone 
employer manage them.164  
Besides this core problem, one must also consider that withholding pay 
from employees is a particularly severe form of paternalism. Proposing to 
withhold property from individuals because one thinks they are 
insufficiently responsible to handle it is a very strong claim that would 
require very strong evidence. But the evidence discussed in this section falls 




This section tackled the argument that the payday serves employees by 
helping them budget their own money. It showed why this intuitive idea 
fails as an explanation—among other things, it neglects to consider how 
larger paychecks can invite excess spending. More critically, this section 
argued that this theory also fails as a justification for the payday; this type 
of paternalism requires an excessive degree of trust in employers. Thus, 
whatever limited explanatory power this theory has, it is insufficient to 
justify this practice. 
F. Legislation 
Employment law is highly regulated at both the federal and state level, 
and the payday is no exception. As this section shows, the payday is affected 
by both federal and state legislation in ways both visible and invisible.  
Legislation provides the most direct explanation of the payday in the 
public sector. As a result of extensive pay regulation, most public 
employees are paid  on a biweekly or a semimonthly basis. Federal 
 
163. Even without present-bias, large debts can exacerbate risk taking by managers. See, e.g., 
Zhiyao Chen & Ran Duchin, Do Nonfinancial Firms Use Financial Assets to Take Risk? 2 (May 1, 
2019) (unpublished manuscript) (“A vast body of theoretical work predicts that firms will invest in 
riskier projects as they become distressed . . . .”). 
164. The authors foresee this objection but dismiss it: “[I]t is not particularly important who 
conducts the timing-welfare calculation, as long as someone does.” Parsons & Van Wesep, supra note 
20, at 383. The fact that, despite the considerable risks, employers are the ones who supposedly save for 
employees is too important to be casually dismissed.  












legislation sets a biweekly pay period.165 State laws, similarly, will often set 
a biweekly or semimonthly pay schedule for state employees. 166  Local 
governments also pay twice a month. Of the 200 largest cities in the United 
States, 189 (94.5%) pay on a biweekly or semimonthly basis.167 With 22 
million Americans employed as government employees,168 we thus find 
legislation to be a direct explanation for pay practices in this sector.  
As for the private sector, the analysis is far more nuanced. In the private 
sector, no law sets pay frequency directly. Instead, states set payment 
frequency floors—the requirement that the employer will not delay pay for 
longer than, normally, two weeks. It is possible that the private sector 
simply imitates pay practices in the public sector, but this possibility seems 
weak, given the stakes involved. If employers could set lower pay with more 
frequent pay, then the analysis above suggests that it would be profitable for 
them to do so. To the extent that debt spirals also affect worker productivity, 
stability, and reliability, we would expect the private sector to be somewhat 
responsive to such pressures.169 
Indirectly, however, legislation inadvertently incentivizes infrequent 
pay. Ironically, it is mostly pro-worker legislation that promotes infrequent 
pay.  
Take minimum wage laws. We have already seen these laws fail to 
regulate the interaction of minimum wage and pay frequency—thus, 
allowing employers to cut back on pay frequency without violating the 
law.170 Another problem emerges in the context of tipped and commission-
based employees—an important part of the workforce, with approximately 
4.3 million tipped workers in the United States.171 For these employees, the 
 
165. 5 U.S.C. § 5504(a) (2018) (“The pay period for an employee covers two administrative 
workweeks.”); see also U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 
1986 302 (106th ed. 1985) [hereinafter 1986 ABSTRACT] (noting that “most Federal employees are paid 
on a biweekly basis”). 
166.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-6-1 (2020) (semi-monthly); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 200(1) 
(McKinney 2018) (biweekly); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 82-50-021 (2020) (semi-monthly). 
167. CITY OF CHESAPEAKE, VA AUDIT SERVS. DEP’T, CITY PAYROLL CYCLES SPECIAL AUDIT 11 
(2019), http://www.cityofchesapeake.net/Assets/documents/departments/audit/department-audits/Payr 
oll+Cycle+Full+Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVH4-4XMR]. 
168. Employment, Hours, and Earnings from the Current Employment Statistics Survey 
(National), BUREAU OF LABOR STATS. (Apr. 18, 2020), https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/CES9000000001 
[https://perma.cc/8N8F-A2DS]. 
169. A set of economic arguments involve nominal rigidity of wages or “sticky wages”—the 
failure of payments to adjust, mostly downward, to changing market conditions. This may further 
explain the pattern of biweekly pay, although even sticky wages are thought to adjust in the long run. 
See generally Alessandro Barattieri et al., Some Evidence on the Importance of Sticky Wages, 6 AM. 
ECON. J.: MACROECON. 70 (2014).  
170. See supra Part II.C. Admittedly, Pay frequency ceilings mitigate some of this effect. 













Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) permits employers to pay below 
minimum wage, so long as the lower wage plus tips averages to the 
minimum wage over the pay period.172 As a result, employers are induced 
to set a long pay period, so as to average daily variations in pay, as the 
following example demonstrates. 
Suppose that an employee makes $1300 in tips in one week and $100 in 
the next. The average is $700—well beyond the biweekly federal minimum 
of $580—so the employer need not pay the employee any extra amount.173 
But what happens if the pay period is shorter? Suppose an employer instead 
paid on a weekly basis. The employee makes $1300 the first week, well 
beyond the minimum wage, so the employer would again not need to 
compensate the employee. But in the second week, the employee only 
makes $100, well below the weekly minimum wage of $290. By making the 
payday shorter, the employer now has to pay the employee an extra $190. 
As this example demonstrates, for tipped and commissioned employees, 
minimum wage legislation unwittingly incentivizes longer pay periods. 
Admittedly, for many tipped employees this harm is mitigated by the 
common practice of paying cash tips daily—but as many tips are paid on 
credit, this problem remains important.174 
Overtime legislation presents a similar averaging problem, although to a 
lesser extent. If overtime obligations are tied to pay frequency, employers 
would want to prolong pay periods to smooth periods of high work. In a 
biweekly pay period, the employer could avoid paying overtime in the first 
week if there is less work in the second week. The Department of Labor and 
many courts have taken the view that employers are not allowed to average 
over more than one week and that overtime legislation is done on a weekly 
 
AND STILL WAITING FOR CHANGE: WHY IT’S TIME TO GIVE TIPPED WORKERS THE REGULAR MINIMUM 
WAGE 7 (2014), https://www.epi.org/files/2014/EPI-CWED-BP379.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZSH7-LFZ6 
]. This estimate does not cover commission-based employees. 
172. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) (2018); 48B AM. JUR. 2D Labor 
and Labor Relations § 3108 (2020). See also DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK CHAPTER 
30, RECORDS, MINIMUM WAGE, AND PAYMENT OF WAGES 30b01(b)(1) (2016), https://www.dol.gov/wh 
d/FOH/FOH_Ch30.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ME9-UD3C] (“[T]he salary is sufficient to meet the 
minimum wage requirements for all hours worked during the pay period . . . .”); id. at 30b05(c)(1) 
(“There is no requirement that wages be paid weekly, as long as some regular pay period (such as 
biweekly or monthly) is established . . . . The only requirement is that employees receive prompt payment 
of the minimum wage covering all hours worked during the pay period.”). In California, see CAL. CODE 
REGS. tit. 8, § 11010(4)(B) (2020) (“[M]inimum wage for all hours worked in the payroll period . . . .”). 
173. The employer still owes the employee the federal minimum wage per hour for a tipped 
employee of $2.13 per hour, which is not included in the example for the sake of clarity. 29 U.S.C. § 
203(m) (2018). Chisolm v. Gravitas Rest. Ltd., No. CIV.A. H-07-475, 2008 WL 838760, at *2 (S.D. 
Tex. Mar. 25, 2008). 
174. See Should You Use Your Credit Card to Tip?, CBS NEWS: MONEYTIPS (June 16, 2015, 1:34 
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/should-you-use-your-credit-card-to-tip/ [https://perma.cc/64EZ-
ELUH] (noting the time lag associated with credit card tips).  












basis. 175  Some courts, however, have taken a different approach, as 
explained by Judge Easterbrook: “[I]t is unlikely that Congress meant to 
require employers to pay overtime in the lean weeks when the fat weeks 
more than make up.”176 To the extent that employers are allowed to average 
pay over pay periods, they would have an incentive to prolong that period. 
A much deeper problem with overtime legislation concerns the definition 
of salaried employees, who are a large minority of the working 
population.177 A salary is a fixed payment that does not depend on actual 
hours worked.178 The FLSA permits employers to avoid paying overtime to 
salaried employees. 179  Because employers might abuse this system by 
designating employees as salaried employees, the FLSA sets clear criteria 
as to which class of workers are exempt from overtime obligations, the 
“exempt” employee.180 For example, if a worker is docked pay for working 
fewer hours, then the employer can no longer claim that the worker is 
exempt from overtime pay.181  
The problem is that the FLSA also imposes a formal test, the “salary 
basis test”: an employee cannot be considered salaried “if the employee 
regularly receives each pay period on a weekly, or less frequent basis, a 
predetermined amount.”182 This test links pay frequency and pay status, and 
it leads to the absurd result that an employer who pays employees daily will 
 
175. 29 C.F.R. § 778.104 (2018) (“[FLSA] takes a single workweek as its standard and does not 
permit averaging of hours . . . .”); Overtime Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y. DEP’T. OF LABor, https:// 
www.labor.ny.gov/legal/counsel/pdf/overtime-frequently-asked-questions.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YCB 
-QBPT]. See also Fernandez v. Centerplate/NBSE, 441 F.3d 1006, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“FLSA 
requires employers to pay overtime compensation for time worked in excess of forty hours per week, 
but not for time worked in excess of eight hours per day . . . .”); Freixa v. Prestige Cruise Servs., LLC, 
853 F.3d 1344, 1346 (11th Cir. 2017).  
176. Walton v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 786 F.2d 303, 307 (7th Cir. 1986). See also Triple 
“AAA” Co. v. Wirtz, 378 F.2d 884, 887 (10th Cir. 1967) (allowing for averaging over a year); Forster 
v. Smartstream, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-866-J-PDB, 2016 WL 70605, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2016); Schwind 
v. EW & Assocs., Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 560, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Gatto v. Mortg. Specialists of Ill., 
Inc., 442 F. Supp. 2d 529, 542 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
177. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., CHARACTERISTICS OF MINIMUM WAGE WORKERS 2018 
(Mar. 2019), https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/minimum-wage/2018/home.htm [https://perma.cc/3PB 
D-SQYE].  
178. Garrett Reid Krueger, Straight-Time Overtime and Salary Basis: Reform of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1097, 1103 (1995) (“Typically, salaried employees do not ‘punch a 
clock,’ are not paid by the hour, and are not docked pay if they do not work forty hours in a given 
week.”).  
179. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2018). 
180. Robert L. Levin, Salaried or Hourly: Do Your Exempt Employees Meet the “Salary Test” 
Under the FLSA?, 11 LAB. L. 25, 25 (1995). When employers pay employees who work in a “fluctuating 
workweek” arrangement, they need to pay only one half of the regular hourly rate, rather than 1.5 of that 
rate. The hourly rate, oddly, is lower the more overtime hours the employee clocks, a practice approved 
by the courts. See generally C.W. Von Bergen, Using the Fluctuating Workweek Compensation Method 
to Reduce Overtime Expenses in Public Organizations, 40 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 165 (2011).  
181. Brock v. Claridge Hotel & Casino, 846 F.2d 180, 184–85 (3d Cir. 1988).  












also have to pay overtime, whereas an employer who chooses infrequent 
pay can also avoid overtime pay. 183  This outcome directly contradicts 
FLSA’s purpose to protect workers from “labor conditions [that are] 
detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary 
for [the] health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.”184 By tying 
pay frequency to legal protections, the law deters employers from paying 
employees daily, lest they be considered unsalaried. 
In these various ways, legislation explains pay practices. In the public 
sector, the explanation is simple fiat; but why not pay public sector 
employees more often? The low return on treasury bonds shows that the 
government can easily borrow at low rates. 185  Private employers may 
conform to public sector standards and are, in any case, incentivized to delay 
payments because of well-intentioned but poorly-drafted legislation. And 
while fiat and bad legislative design may explain the payday, they do not 
justify it. 
G. Check Cutting Costs 
Paying workers is expensive. This section explores the various costs 
involved in paying workers and highlights how these costs can be an 
obstacle to regular pay. Schematically, paying involves four different 
stages: (1) determining pay due; (2) calculating withholding for compliance 
purposes; (3) transferring payments; and (4) receiving payments. The first 
two stages involve costs that are affected by payroll technology; the latter 
two involve costs due to money technology.  
The first cost is that of the determination of payment due. This is mostly 
a technological problem, and it has largely been resolved. Determining due 
pay for salaried employees is almost trivial in modern times.186 For other 
types of employees, the determination may be somewhat more complex—
but not by a large margin. The employee time clock was patented in 1891,187 
and with the broad integration of computers and mobile devices in the 
 
183. To the best of my knowledge, this topic was never litigated, so it is an open question how the 
courts would rule. My conversations with practitioners suggest a general belief that courts would be 
willing to divorce pay frequency from the actual definition of salaried employees, although given the 
plain language of the text, it is unclear how they would reach this outcome. 
184. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2018). 
185. Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/ 
resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/pages/textview.aspx?data=yield [https://perma.cc/RT6 
G-6CGB].  
186. The biweekly pay is simply given by dividing the annual salary by twenty-four for a semi-
monthly paid employee. Withholdings and deductions can complicate the calculus, but with payroll 
software, these issues are generally easily resolved in practice.  
187. U.S. Patent No. 452,894 (filed May 26, 1891). 












modern workplace, most time-tracking today is automated. 188  True, 
employers want to verify every reported work hour, a task that does not 
scale up well. However, this difficulty is inherent to the employment 
relationship for reasons other than pay frequency, and as we shall see, this 
concern can be effectively resolved with careful design of pay 
obligations.189  
A seemingly more serious cost is compliance. Even after assessing the 
employees’ wages, the employer must still verify that it is properly 
assessing compulsory and voluntary deductions, that levies are effectively 
put aside, that child support and alimony payments are correctly computed, 
and that any wage garnishments are deducted. Then, the employer must 
verify compliance with all minimum wage and overtime legislation. Finally, 
the employer must keep a record of hours worked and communicate this 
information to the employee. These challenges may have been enormous in 
the past, as properly computing withholding manually is a long, arduous, 
and error-prone process. But today, none of these challenges are especially 
onerous with the advent of the modern computer and payroll software. The 
per payroll cost of paying an employee in medium-sized companies appears 
to be between $1 and $5, although companies differ significantly in their 
pricing methodologies.190 Completing a payroll “run” may involve a real 
cost, but this cost is no longer prohibitive.191  
Despite the availability of software, employers still want to verify the 
accuracy of all payments, because failure to comply can result in criminal, 
civil, and ethical sanctions. The FLSA, for example, imposes criminal fines 
and even imprisonment for failures to comply.192 This liability also extends 
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to corporate officers.193 The consequences can also be disciplinary for some 
professionals. One lawyer was put on probation for eighteen months for 
failure to file and pay various federal, state, and local payroll tax obligations 
on a timely basis.194 The FLSA also includes a civil sanction: failure to pay 
wages can result in liquidated damages equal to all unpaid wages195 and 
attorney fees.196 Given the costs of mistakes, the employer will want to 
include safeguards—such as manual revision of at least some of the 
paystubs. Under the current system, these safeguards should be employed 
at every pay cycle, and because they do not scale well, increasing the pay 
frequency can drastically increase costs. Illustrative was the momentary 
expression of horror when, in an interview with a payroll director for a large 
organization, I mentioned the possibility of moving to a daily payday.197 
Overall, payroll technology is sufficiently mature to resolve the basic 
aspect of calculating pay; however, an outstanding issue is the problem of 
verification and compliance. These processes do not scale well and become 
increasingly costly with higher-frequency pay. 
Moving to money technology, for most employers and employees, 
transferring money is a largely invisible process. Roughly 87% of 
households are paid using direct deposit,198 a money transfer technology 
that involves the Automated Clearing House (ACH) system. Normally, 
there are no charges on the employee side; but employers are charged 
roughly $0.26–$0.50 per transfer.199  Employers also incur an additional 
administrative cost (in terms of personnel and IT) of $0.11–$0.25, 
suggesting a total cost of $0.37–$0.75 per single employee payment for one 
pay period. 200  These costs are not substantial by themselves, although 
moving from biweekly to daily payments can increase costs by $5.18–
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$10.50 per two weeks.201  Even for a minimum wage employee, this is 
roughly the cost of another hour of work—a real, but not prohibitive, cost. 
The problem is the “Other America.”202 In 2017, 14.1 million adults were 
unbanked, meaning they did not have either a checking or a savings 
account.203 In addition, 48.9 million were “underbanked,” i.e., they were 
using non-banks for financial products (such as check cashing, payday 
lending, or money orders) despite having a bank account. 204  As a 
consequence, 27.6% of households receive some of their payments in a 
paper check or money order, and 7.9% receive payments in cash.205 The 
under- and unbanked are also poorer on average.206 
Employees not paid via direct deposit are mostly paid by check or money 
orders—two dated, lengthy, unreliable, and expensive money technologies. 
For the employer, the simple cost of writing a check is estimated by one 
source at upwards of $4 per check.207 Checks are also physical objects, 
which add friction and costs related to security and delivery. Even the 
delivery of checks is unreliable; one employee described her experience: 
“the checks were delivered by oft-delayed trucks that, living paycheck-to-
paycheck, sometimes left her family in dire financial straits.”208  
Checks must be cashed somehow, and cash checking services flourish 
around the nation.209 These services offer immediate money for checks, but 
because checks are such a slow and unreliable technology, these businesses 
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assume a considerable risk for their services.210 A check can be easily forged 
and, even if authentic, can still bounce. Cash checking services provide a 
real service, but they charge high rates. One study reports a range of 1.5%–
3.3% of the check’s face value.211 This means that, on average, there is a 
cost of $40 per paycheck for typical households with full-time workers to 
even access their earned money.212 If used regularly over one’s career, the 
household will spend $41,600 in fees—money that could otherwise be used 
to build wealth for retirement.213 Indeed, some of these fees are avoidable 
by cashing the check at the bank of issue (i.e., the employer’s bank), but this 
involves the time and cost of travel to the bank.214 Getting to the location, 
safely carrying the check, and waiting in line are non-trivial costs; especially 
since paydays tend to be synchronized, leading to congestion.215  
Finally, the use of cash presents its own difficulties. Roughly 8% of 
households are paid in cash.216 Paying with cash requires carrying large 
amounts, which involves administrative overhead. More importantly, the 
perfect liquidity of cash invites theft risk, both for the employer and for the 
employee. Carrying large amounts of cash exposes one to risks, and there is 
little wonder why most people prefer to carry small amounts of cash on their 
person.  
In conclusion, while money technology has improved dramatically over 
the last century, many employees are still being paid using dated 
technologies—checks and cash. These dated payment methods impose 
significant costs, making daily payment prohibitively expensive. While 
digital money exists and offers important efficiencies, it still has to 
overcome the under-banking gap and other issues of implementation. 
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III. ABOLISHING THE PAYDAY 
The payday is a common feature of employment contracts. The payday 
implicates a credit transaction (K2), but this credit transaction is not 
motivated by the logic of credit. Instead, the investigation of this practice 
suggests that it owes a large part of its vitality to outdated legislation and 
money technology. Even the most sympathetic justifications of the 
payday—those which are rooted in employee psychology—still leave the 
current arrangements in a poor light. 
The goal of this Part is to explain why abolishing the payday and moving 
to daily streams of payment is critical, valuable, and more effective than 
some intermediate solutions that are currently being proposed. If abolition 
initially strikes one as radical, recall that in the nineteenth century, weekly 
payment systems were already in place217—during a time in which one had 
to do all calculations by hand and transport a chest with coins between work 
locations.218 Daily payments are well within reach today. 
A. The Stakes of Abolishing the Payday  
Suspending for a moment the how, let us consider the implications of 
abolishing the payday and moving to daily streams of payment. 
In the first instance, the current biweekly payday harms workers. True, 
paying employees more frequently will not make households wealthier, but 
it will make them more capable of meeting life challenges as they come. 
Over the last few years, interest rates were at a historic low; but the stakes 
of abolishing payday will only increase if interest rates revert to their 
historical rates.219 Lack of liquidity is associated with a variety of negative 
health outcomes.220 Abolishing the payday would help ease some of this 
pressure. The stress of thinking about how to pay for groceries the next day, 
whether one should skip the next dentist appointment, or the arguments with 
one’s partner can be alleviated with greater control over one’s finances. 
Indeed, the records from the nineteenth-century move to weekly payments 
suggest a marked increase in reported employee well-being.221  
Greater liquidity also allows one to seize opportunities as they present 
themselves. Some of these opportunities are humdrum, although 
consequential for one’s financial health, like buying discounted items in 
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bulk. Other opportunities can have even larger effects, like buying a ticket 
to fly out to an interview with another employer. It is perhaps natural for a 
well-off reader to discount the difficulty insufficient liquidity imposes on 
life choices, but even the cost of dry cleaning or a haircut can prevent some 
from attending a job interview.222 
One potential negative aspect of abolishing payday is that it will restrict 
credit access to businesses. Firms today borrow at cheap rates through the 
withholding of pay and abolishing the payday might limit their access to 
credit, especially if the firm is a small business. This issue should not be 
overstated. Worker wages should not be an open line of credit. When the 
firm taps into this source of credit, it exposes workers to the risk of its own 
bankruptcy, and it imposes on them the costs associated with low liquidity. 
While Walmart enjoys the float from withholding pay, the costs endured by 
its employees far exceed this benefit.  
Small businesses are often under more severe credit pressures, and for 
many of them, access to credit is even more essential.223 This consideration, 
however, does not mean that workers’ wages should be the solution. In fact, 
it may suggest more caution with exposing workers’ wages to business 
risks. If the small business is over-extended, using unpaid wages to finance 
operations jeopardizes workers. As a society, we face a basic choice as to 
who should be the source of liquidity for small businesses—should it be 
workers with their salaries or sophisticated credit markets, which are 
capable of evaluating, monitoring, and pricing risk. Keeping the payday to 
finance business operations is a policy choice that is available to us—but it 
appears a bad one: workers should not be in the business of lending money 
to their employers. 
Another related negative consequence of abolishing the payday is the 
elimination of the wage premium associated with it. As discussed, one 
might expect a wage premium for longer paydays for two reasons. First, the 
employer receives the benefit of holding (and using) the money until the 
payday, and second, the employer saves the costs of making more regular 
payments. Now, for those who think that employees do not receive a 
meaningful wage premium today for K2 loans, this consequence is largely 
irrelevant. Even for those who believe that there may be a wage effect, there 
is some reason to doubt its magnitude, if not its existence. The single study 
that evaluated the effect of moving from the monthly payday to the weekly 
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payday—while admittedly dated and incomplete—found that this move 
actually led to an increase in the effective pay and well-being of 
employees.224 This is, in part, because workers chose to work more when 
pay was more frequent. This finding should not be overstated because of 
various methodological and data issues, but it at least suggests that the 
effects of abolishing the payday may be more nuanced than what appears at 
first sight. 
Whatever the case might be about the wage premium, daily pay would 
also have strong positive effects. Most directly, more frequent pay would 
remove workers from the unnatural position of lending money to their 
employers. The employer’s benefit from retaining this money is more than 
offset by the worker’s need for the money. In a very early decision, the 
Supreme Court clearly recognized this point: “[t]here [is] certainly . . . an 
advantage to those who work for a living of a ready purchasing power for 
their needs over the use of credit.” 225  The lack of purchasing power 
manifests itself in many ways—most painfully, in the cost of short-credit 
solutions. The average American has $5673 in revolving credit card debt,226 
on which they pay 16% APR ($580 per year, roughly).227  Credit cards 
appear cheap relative to the burgeoning installment loans industry, which 
charges an effective APR of 40%–90%.228 The installment loans industry 
serves ten million Americans annually and earns over $10 billion in finance 
charges. 229  And this industry is still cheaper than the payday lending 
industry, which charges a typical 400% APR.230 
I do not mean to argue that abolishing the payday would abolish either 
the payday industry or the short-term credit industry.231 People borrow for 
many reasons—smoothing consumption, pursuing opportunities, bracing 
shocks, etc.232 The demand for short-term credit solutions is based on real 
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need, and the lack of liquidity due to the payday is but one of them. Still, 
there is little doubt that short-term credit solutions are very expensive and 
can often lead to inescapable debt spirals. Thus, achieving even a 
meaningful reduction in the demand for these services is a worthy social 
goal. To get a sense of the potential impact, consider the results of a study 
that examined the effects of an unexpected $600 tax rebate on payday 
borrowing. Using a variation in the timing of the rebate, the researchers 
found a large and marked effect on the demand for payday loans. In their 
analysis, payday borrowers were roughly 16% less likely to borrow from 
payday lenders within two pay cycles of receipt of the rebate.233 This effect, 
unfortunately, disappeared after two pay cycles.234 
Another important potential effect of abolishing the payday is that it may 
also lead to the abolition of the wasteful monthly utility payment practice. 
As noted, households consume daily but pay monthly. In consuming now 
and paying later, households are essentially borrowing from utility 
providers. And of course, this credit transaction comes at a cost; utility 
providers charge for offering credit services. This credit transaction is 
artificial; it may be an artifact of the payday itself. With greater liquidity, 
perhaps service providers can be made to charge households on a daily basis 
as well. By moving to daily payments, the cost of utilities can decline by 
what is now the cost of the interest payments that are implicit in the monthly 
bill. If the technology is ripe—and to a large extent it already is—then the 
costs of these additional transactions would be trivial. This means that 
removing this unnecessary credit transaction may result in dramatic 
savings—think about a household that borrows a few hundred dollars every 
month and its annual cost of doing so, multiplied by almost all 
households.235  How much of the savings will actually be passed on to 
households is an important question, and while there is no reason to assume 
that all of the savings will be passed to households, there is also no general 
reason to assume that none of the savings will pass. It is enough for now to 
note that even if some of the savings will pass, the effect of abolishing the 
payday on households can be significant. 
Overall, paying workers more frequently would have an important 
positive effect on their well-being and reduce the demand for short-term 
credit solutions.  
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B. Alternatives to Abolition 
At this point, I hope, the question is no longer whether the payday is 
worth preserving, but rather what the viable alternatives are. As I propose 
the abolition of the payday in favor of daily streams of payment, I should 
explain why other more “moderate” solutions are ill-advised.  
What is perhaps the leading alternative to dealing with the problem of 
the payday is the use of wage advances. Today, there is a flurry of activity 
in this space by Fintech companies that compete over a variety of wage 
advance solutions.236  These products go by different names—wages on 
demand, earned income access, advance wage payment—but they all share 
a basic structure: the employee is paid ahead of the payday as part of the 
anticipated pay.237 The advance is paid by either the employer or a third 
party which specializes in making advances against the employee’s wages. 
In a strict sense, these are not really advances, as they mostly apply to 
earned wages. Hence, the employee is not paid early but is instead lending 
less. But whatever the terminology, the effect is the same—bridging the gap 
between earning one’s pay and the payday. Thus, the concentration of 
activity in this sector is a good indication of the size of the problem of K2 
and vividly demonstrates K2’s inefficiency.  
Such advances can offer a response to short-term liquidity shocks, such 
as a car that suddenly needs a costly repair or an emergency hospital visit. 
Nonetheless, advances are a flawed, incomplete, and potentially harmful 
solution to the underlying problem—justified only if deeper solutions are 
unavailable but otherwise a band-aid for a lost limb. 
The central objection is cost. Paying employees in advance involves cost 
on the side of either the employer or the third-party company. Someone has 
to hold sufficient capital, handle requests, and create mechanisms to ensure 
proper deductions come payday. Few would be willing to bear this cost for 
free.  
While Fintech and terms such as “wage on-demand” sound novel, the 
history of employer advances is longstanding, and it is not wholesome. The 
first wage payment laws emerged as a response to concerns with “employers 
that took improper deductions from worker wages or forced them to borrow 
from employers.”238 The effect of these issues is reflected in the memorable 
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“Sixteen Tons,” written by Merle Travis in 1946 and modeled after his 
father’s experiences working in the coal mines:239 
You load sixteen tons, what do you get? 
Another day older and deeper in debt 
Saint Peter don’t you call me ‘cause I can't go 
I owe my soul to the company store240 
To combat abuse, states passed legislation that regularized paydays and 
limited employers’ ability to deduct fees and interest from employees’ 
wages.241 It is not without irony, notes Professor Steven Willborn, that “the 
payday loan industry had arisen to do almost exactly what employers were 
doing prior to the state wage-payment laws.”242 
Today, there is still great regulatory uncertainty regarding advances.243 
While some view these as services that provide the consumer with much-
needed credit, others see them as opportunities to profit at employees’ 
expense.244 The relevant framework, even at the federal level, is complex—
involving the interpretation of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the 
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), and the Consumer Financial 
Protection Act (CFPA). 245  Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) also adds complexity, as it views the sale of accounts (i.e., future 
payments) as a secured transaction, thus subjecting it to its burdensome 
framework.246 Some state laws also require licenses to lend, limit wage 
assignments, and impose usury limits.247 This results in a very complex 
regulatory landscape, and employers explain their reluctance to offer 
advances in this complexity.248  
Third-party advance companies are for-profit companies, and they turn 
a profit by charging fees, commissions, and, oddly, tips. One such product 
is called Earnin, where users are encouraged to leave a tip of $0–14 per $100 
advanced; failure to leave a tip is believed to restrict the user’s access to 
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[https://perma.cc/CG8U-B5T7] (arguing that, inasmuch as no finance charges are levied, some advance 
products are exempt from TILA but subject to other forms of credit legislation). 
246. U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001). 
247. Hawkins, supra note 153 (manuscript at 15–24). 
248. Id. at 42, note 142. 












cash.249 A $14 charge per $100 is very close to the typical cost of payday 
lending ($15).250 Another study of Fintech companies finds that the average 
APR ranges from 20% to 145%.251 It is damning with faint praise to say that 
these products, “although [expensive] in absolute terms, appear[] clearly 
superior to [short-term loan] alternatives.”252  
Some of the costs are less visible. Professor Jim Hawkins recently 
reviewed the contracts used by market players. He found that despite 
Fintech companies’ self-attestation to being “concerned with their social 
impact” and notwithstanding the intense regulatory scrutiny, their contracts 
are “surprisingly unfriendly” to the consumer.253 Arbitration, disclaimers of 
warranties, unilateral contract amendments, and high fees are some of the 
more common issues.254 It is highly likely that, even if permitted to operate, 
purveyors of advances will be held under strict regulation.255 
Reforming laws to facilitate advances would result in a complicated and 
costly patchwork of legislation. It is inevitable that some advance 
companies will go the way of many lenders in the past: resorting to abusive 
terms, one-sided “mistakes,” and excessive rates. The issue is not so much 
that companies seek to profit; it is that the problem they seek to solve is an 
artifact of badly-designed legislation and dated money technology. Treating 
this problem directly can resolve the liquidity problem directly without 
requiring the development of a newly-regulated industry. Although the 
focus should be on eradicating the payday entirely, advance payments are a 
step in the right direction. They highlight, quite clearly, the unreasonable 
burden K2 imposes on workers. They also develop technologies and 
solutions for regularizing payments. And, to the extent the solutions 
provided here would take time and political will to implement, wage 
advances can serve as an interim solution. 
 
249. Kevin Dugan, Cash-Advance App Earnin Gets Subpoenaed by NY Regulator, N.Y. POST 
(Mar. 28, 2019, 4:09 PM), https://nypost.com/2019/03/28/cash-advance-app-earnin-gets-subpoenaed-
by-ny-regul ator-source/ [https://perma.cc/R6MR-N8MJ] (“Earnin encouraged users to leave a tip of 
anywhere between zero and $14 on a $100 weekly loan. Users who don’t leave a tip appear to have their 
credit restricted. Meanwhile, a $14 tip would equate to a 730-percent APR—nearly 30 times higher than 
New York’s 25 percent cap.”). In evaluating the costs, one should consider the regulatory uncertainty; 
if it would ever be resolved, one might expect greater competition in this space. 
250. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, WHAT ARE THE COSTS AND FEES FOR A PAYDAY LOAN? 
(Jun 15, 2017) https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-are-the-costs-and-fees-for-a-payday-
loan-e n-1589/. 
251. Todd H. Baker, FinTech Alternatives to Short-Term Small-Dollar Credit: Helping Low-
Income Working Families Escape the High-Cost Lending Trap 46 (Harvard Kennedy Sch., M-RCBG 
Associate Working Paper No. 75, 2017), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/ 
files/75_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8SF-FEDY]. 
252. Id. 
253. Hawkins, supra note 153 (manuscript at 23–24). 
254. Id. (manuscript at 23–31). 












IV. A WORLD WITHOUT THE PAYDAY 
The abolition of the payday requires steps that are far more conservative 
than the goal might seem to imply. Indeed, while the problems caused by 
the payday are severe, the solutions are fairly mild. This suggests a low-
hanging policy fruit: large effects with small changes—ones that do not risk 
complex, unanticipated systemic effects. With sufficient goodwill, this 
policy can be implemented in a very short time span, dramatically 
improving the welfare of millions of Americans. In this Part, I will present 
a workable alternative to payday and then move to discuss several 
complementary ways to implement it. Each method has somewhat different 
benefits and costs, and much can be achieved even if only some of these 
methods are implemented. 
Let us first reflect on the two most important barriers to regular pay: 
compliance costs and money technology for the underbanked. Both of these 
issues create a scale problem: while payroll software can fairly accurately 
estimate pay, the costs of inadvertent compliance errors are high, thus 
requiring human supervision and authorization for each payment. Whereas 
ACH money transfers provide a fairly cheap solution, even with daily 
payments, it is inapplicable with respect to the unbanked and underbanked 
who must rely on inefficient alternative money instruments, such as checks. 
In consideration of these issues, I propose the following.256 At the end of 
each day, employers will be required to pay employees at least 93% of a 
good-faith estimate of their earned income.257 The payday will be replaced 
by an “accounting day,” or a true-up, once every two weeks when the 
employer must complete a final calculation of the employee’s full earned 
income for the period. After making this calculation, including all 
adjustments for unclaimed deductions, bonuses, commissions, etc., the 
employer will adjust the daily pay to reflect outstanding amounts. If no 
adjustments are necessary, the employer will pay the employee the daily 7% 
shortfall, which would come to an extra day’s worth of pay, once every two 
weeks. As long as the employer makes a good faith estimate of the daily 
pay, the employer will not be held liable for regulatory compliance issues 
 
256. The mode of reform can be legislative, but it is worth noting that the Restatement of 
Employment Law also recognizes the possibility of changes to employment law through the common 
law. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 3.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2019) (“[W]age-payment laws . . . . do 
not generally preclude common-law development because they are based on contract principles found 
in the common law.”). 
257. The choice of 93% is meant to create enough reserve to capture a full day’s wage. So if the 
employee works ten days in a fourteen-day period and earns $1923, the employee’s daily pay will be 
$137.60, and the biweekly adjustment will pay the employee an additional $134.60.  












for daily pay—such liability will only follow if, as is today, the employer 
fails to pay in full on accounting day.258 
Under this proposal, employers will not pay their workers their full daily 
pay but only an estimate of part of it. The reason why employers will not be 
required to pay in full is grounded in a few considerations. It is very difficult 
to know the total amounts due to employees, given all the possible 
deductions, taxes, and levies. Hence, some estimation may be unavoidable, 
and this means that there will often be errors, either of over- or under-
payment. If employers are not afforded some margin of error, that would 
require them to carefully review each payment—and the costs of doing so 
daily may be prohibitive.259 Another important consideration is that it is 
arguably harder for the employer to collect money owed from the employee 
than vice versa, given the greater mobility of the employee and lack of 
collateral. Leaving 7% of the income to the last day of the fourteen-day 
period is calculated to create a buffer that, on the one hand, allows the 
employee to keep most of the daily pay and, on the other hand, accounts for 
potential errors in daily estimates. Subject to further experimentation, this 
margin should be sufficient to allow employers to make offsets against 
mistakes in overpaying employees.260 It also means that the employee is 
receiving on the last day of the biweekly period an extra day’s pay (which 
is deducted from their on-going payments). The extra paycheck may appeal 
to those who think employer-based budgeting is helpful. 
The design of biweekly pay is meant to address two concerns: wage 
monitoring and compliance-cost control. Wage theft is an important 
concern, and monitoring daily payments may be harder than monitoring the 
transfers of larger lump sums. 261  Of course, once the employee grows 
accustomed to daily pay, he or she could detect deviations by comparing 
actual payments to normal payments. Still, with possible daily fluctuations, 
deviations are harder to detect. To deal with this problem, on accounting 
day, the employer would produce a pay stub that accounts for all of the 
biweekly payments. The employee can then compare this amount to 
amounts paid, just as easily as can be done today.262 The second function is 
controlling compliance costs. As noted, a large part of the cost of making 
 
258. Given the predictability of pay for most professions and the low profit from underpaying 
every day, this duty is not expected to generate considerable friction or litigation. 
259. See supra Part II.G. (discussing costs of payroll). 
260. In most industries, a much smaller buffer would be needed—and perhaps no buffer is even 
needed for salaried employees with fix wages. Still, it is prudent to start with a moderate buffer in 
experimenting with the implementation of this proposal. 
261. On wage theft, see supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
262. It may be necessary to add in the bank’s user-interface support for easy comparisons of 
employer-pay per wage period. Such technology is already implemented in the apps and websites of 












payments is due to the need to verify compliance with a variety of different 
laws. Because the final accounting is only done once every two weeks, the 
employer would not need to engage in more compliance than it does today, 
besides the fairly trivial calculation of 93% of the expected daily pay. Note 
that the employer does not bear liability for small or unintentional 
deviations, making it unnecessary to verify daily payments with the same 
degree of attention as the biweekly pay. 
One remaining issue is the control of money-transfer costs. As noted, 
this is not an issue for the majority of workers, who are banked and can 
benefit from ACH transfers, but it is still a pressing and painful issue for the 
under- and unbanked. The solution here is technological, and I explore in 
greater length the use of pay cards as a viable solution to this problem.263 In 
addition to pay cards, others have proposed non-technological alternatives, 
such as postal and public banking, which can also mitigate these issues.264 
An optional addition to this proposal would be to allow employees to 
elect a biweekly payday. That is, the daily pay would be presented as an 
option alongside biweekly pay, and employees could elect which payment 
option they prefer. In terms of preserving employee choice, this would seem 
superior, as those employees who find biweekly pay more manageable 
would elect it. Such a choice may be preferred by some—if the worker has 
no need for liquidity or finds it difficult to budget otherwise. But for the 
reasons I laid out earlier, I believe employer-side savings is a bad idea due 
to the counterparty risk.265 If employees need help budgeting, bank-side 
savings programs are a superior alternative. And if employees want to lend 
money, they can always do so in explicit capital markets, where there is 
more robust competition for their money. Hence, there is legitimate concern 
that presenting this option may be a trap for the unwary and will serve little 
other function.266 
The final part of this proposal is that it envisions a transition and 
experimentation period. Wages and payments are systemic issues; they 
affect every part of the economy. The urgent need for reform should be 
tempered with patience and understanding that immediate implementation 
may be harmful. Instead, an announcement of a target date for daily pay in 
a few years, perhaps coupled with a transition to weekly pay, is likely the 
most prudent course of action. 
 
263. See infra Part I.D. 
264. The U.S. postal banking system was abolished in 1966. On its history and for a proposal to 
reinstate it, see MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS 183–226 (2018); see also Postal 
Banking: Know the Facts, CAMPAIGN FOR POSTAL BANKING, http://www.campaignforpostalbanking.or 
g/know-the-facts/ [https://perma.cc/GW9R-XJKB].  
265. See supra Part II.E. 
266. A more compelling reason to favor biweekly pay is if the check-cutting costs are high, the 
employee could be paid more by being paid less frequently. However, this is a transitionary issue until 
the money and payroll technology are sufficiently advanced. 












Implementing this reform would require some legislative changes. The 
key changes are focused on changing labor laws that impede more frequent 
pay; changing our money infrastructure; improving market education; and 
changing the market by leadership. Each of these interventions, summarized 
in the Table below, is developed in the following subsections: 
Promoting Frequent Pay 
Method Type of Change Notes 
Information Demand-side pressure by making 
implicit interest transparent 
Least intrusive 
Leading/fiat Changing legislation to encourage 
and mandate frequent pay 
Requires 







Removing inadvertent incentives 
to reduce pay frequency 
Requires 






Making payments cheaper, 





A. Changing by Information 
One reason why the payday persists is related to the employer’s power 
in employment negotiation. Perhaps employees are insufficiently aware of 
the credit nature of K2. If that is the case, employees would also be unaware 
of the true cost of K2 and would not demand an appropriate wage premium. 
This imbalance of information or sophistication tilts the balance in favor of 
the employer and leads to inefficiently infrequent pay periods. 
This idea—that individuals misprice credit transactions—is a central 
impetus for the enactment of TILA. Congress diagnosed that consumers 
engage in “uninformed use of credit” and prescribed “meaningful disclosure 
of credit terms.” 267  By conspicuously disclosing credit terms using a 
uniform standard, TILA hopes to improve consumer finance decisions.268 
 
267. Truth in Lending Act § 102(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2018).  
268. See generally Hosea H. Harvey, Opening Schumer’s Box: The Empirical Foundations of 












The logic of TILA can be brought to bear on payday.269 If employers 
want to borrow money from employees through the payday, they might be 
required to disclose the fact that payday is a credit transaction. This can be 
done in the written employment contract or in a separate disclosure. More 
importantly, the employer might be required to display the (implicit) interest 
rate in this transaction. Using the same language as that used when 
consumers borrow—the so-called Schumer’s Box—the employer will be 
required to disclose how much the employee receives in exchange for the 
extension of credit. This disclosure would allow workers, subject to the 
general caveats about disclosure in general, 270  to better understand the 
meaning of the credit element of the payday and to “shop” effectively—that 
is, to understand how pay frequency compares to the cost of borrowing from 
other sources and choose, if given the option, a shorter pay period. The 
following figure illustrates using a typical employee who earns $1923 
biweekly.271  
Figure 3 – An Illustration of “Schumer Box” 
Interest Rates and Interest Charges 
Annual Percentage 
Rate (APR) for 
Biweekly Pay 
5%  This the amount of interest paid to 
you. Compare to your cost of 
borrowing. 
Biweekly Interest 
Charges Paid to 
Employee 
$4 This is the amount of interest the 
employer pays you for delaying 
your payments by two weeks 
Total Wage 
(Biweekly) 
$1923  $1919 base + $4 interest 
The use of disclosure also has one substantive implication in the context 
of the minimum wage. If an employer borrows money, it should identify the 
portion of the pay that is the wage premium. The remaining pay is the pay-
for-work portion of the wage paid to the worker. A prolonged pay period 
undercuts the minimum wage obligations of the employer; paying $7.25 
hourly with a daily payday is not the same as paying it monthly. In the latter 
case, the effective pay is much lower, and the employer is arguably failing 
to meet the minimum wage obligations, at least in spirit. That federal 
legislation does not account for this difference suggests a serious blind spot, 
even among legislators and judges. Once advertised, courts could start 
 
269. For illustration, see Figure 2 in Part I.C, which illustrates how effective pay is comprised of 
both per-hour wages and frequency of payments. 
270. See generally Yonathan A. Arbel & Andrew Toler, All-Caps, J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD 
(forthcoming 2020) (providing evidence of the failure of the most common mode of conspicuous 
disclosures, disclosure via all-caps). 
271. Wage data based on Measures of Central Tendency for Wage Data, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https:/ 
/www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/central.html [https://perma.cc/QM3L-FENF].  












paying better attention to determine the proper baseline envisioned by the 
FLSA—is it daily pay, weekly pay, or something else? 
B. Changing by Leading 
Another potential explanation for the persistence of the payday is that 
government employees are paid biweekly. 272  Social norms can have a 
significant effect on market outcomes, and if the government declares a 
certain pay period to be the standard, then this pronouncement might have 
downstream effects on private employers. 
If this explanation carries any explanatory power, it opens the road to 
straightforward intervention. Under Title 5 of the United States Code, all 
federal employees are to be paid once every two administrative 
workweeks.273 This period could be changed to a daily payment of 93% of 
the daily pay, subject to a biweekly accounting. Notably, the change will 
not infringe on any employee’s rights. Nor will this reform require large 
substantive changes. Admittedly, changing federal legislation is not easy, 
and I do not mean to discount the political and procedural challenges, 
especially because state law is so diverse and will also have to be amended. 
However, the importance of the goal and its non-partisan nature promise 
some optimism.  
C. Fixing Employment Law 
One impediment to abolishing the payday is, ironically, minimum wage 
legislation. As I have noted, the FLSA makes employers average the 
minimum wage payments over the entire pay period.274 This incentivizes 
employers to extend the pay period as much as possible so they can benefit 
from averaging. If a tipped employee is making above minimum wage in 
week one and below minimum wage in week two, the employer could avoid 
compensating the employee for week two by setting a biweekly payday. We 
also saw that overtime legislation, at least in theory, does not have this flaw. 
The faulty legislative design opens the door to a number of potential 
interventions. The key to all of these options is to divorce the averaging 
period from the pay period. Hence, the option with the least effect on the 
status quo would permit employers to choose their accounting periods. The 
accounting period would substitute today’s payday and would be the day on 
which the employer will average the employee’s pay and see if any amounts 
 
272. See supra Part I.F. 
273. 5 U.S.C. § 5504(a) (2018).  












are still due to meet the minimum wage requirement for the accounting 
period. The length of the accounting period could be regulated by the same 
limitations set today by state legislation on pay periods. This way, the 
employer would pay the employee each day of the week and then, come 
accounting day, make sure that a minimum wage was paid. If there was any 
shortfall in payments, the employer would add it to that day’s pay. Over a 
two-week period (or however long the accounting period is) the employee 
would be paid the exact same amount the employee would have been paid 
under the payday—but at more frequent intervals. This aspect of the 
proposal means that neither employee nor employer rights are harmed by 
this transition, yet the indignities of the payday are avoided.  
Similarly, overtime legislation should divorce pay frequency from the 
definition of who is a salaried employee; there is no reason to tie the 
definition to the (in)frequency of pay.275 A daily-paid employee can equally 
be salaried or unsalaried, and the frequency of pay need not reflect on this 
determination. 
Finally, employers’ compliance with wage and hour laws should be 
evaluated at the accounting period. Thus, if an employer makes a 
compliance error on a specific day, this should not be a cause for a lawsuit. 
The goal is to reduce ongoing compliance costs, and allowing lawsuits to 
proceed based on random errors would undermine this goal. At the same 
time, employers are still under a duty to make a good-faith estimate of the 
93% pay the employee deserves. This means that employers do not have a 
carte-blanche right to underpay employees daily. While one-off or even 
occasional mistakes should not be grounds for a lawsuit, the employee 
should be allowed to sue for systematic mistakes if they are done in the 
employer’s favor. Hence, the proposal does not derogate in any way from 
minimum wage laws or overtime laws under the status-quo; it neither 
increases pay nor reduces it. The only effect is on pay frequency. 
D. Improving Money Technology 
Transferring money is more difficult than would appear at first glance. I 
have already noted the various costs associated with bank transfers, the 
difficulty of storing and handling cash, and the many costs of writing and 
liquidating checks.276  
Digital money is clearly the future, and, to a growing extent, it is the 
present. 277  In particular, employers are now increasingly using payroll 
 
275. If one believes that this definition tracks any meaningful practical distinction, it is possible 
to use the accounting period instead of the current pay period as the measure of the period. 
276. See supra II.G. 
277. An estimated 4% of Americans hold only a prepaid card. Analysis based on data presented 
in Bricker et al., supra note 5, at 18–19. 












cards.278 A payroll card is akin to a debit card and is issued by a bank or 
another financial institution. The account is not attached to any depository 
account, and thus, the card owner is spared the cost and difficulty of opening 
a bank account. Instead, the owner charges the card against the available 
balance. In 2017, roughly 3.4% of households reported receiving income 
with a payroll card,279 and one projection estimates a $50.9 billion-dollar 
market in 2021.280 In 2015, nineteen state governments were already using 
payroll cards,281 and one survey suggests that seven million workers were 
using them in 2014.282 
Payroll cards are convenient and safe, and they allow the immediate use 
of the funds paid. Importantly, the employee does not have to have a bank 
account to use a payroll card. This means that one’s creditworthiness and 
legal status are not hurdles. Moreover, the employee need not maintain a 
minimum balance in his or her bank account or pay fees. The cost of 
depositing funds is also reportedly low: $0.35 in deposit costs.283 It is not 
surprising, then, that many low-paid employees view payroll cards 
positively.284 
There are also various concerns with payroll cards, many of which will 
be familiar to users of bank accounts.285 One concern is the insurance of 
amounts deposited on these cards—what prevents a “run on the card”? Then 
there is the issue of fees: ATM-use fees, point of sale fees (i.e., a transaction 
fee), overdraft fees, and even balance inquiry fees.286 By one estimate, the 
 
278. On the other hand, a survey by the FDIC found that usage of prepaid cards by households 
ranged between 7.9% (2013), 9.8% (2015), and 9.2% (2017). FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 198, 
at 7. 9.2% of households using a prepaid card reported receiving it as a payroll card. Id.  
279. Id. at 12.  
280. What Percentage of the Prepaid Market Are Payroll Cards?, PAYMENTS JOURNAL, (Sep. 16, 
2019), https://www.paymentsjournal.com/what-percentage-of-the-prepaid-market-are-payroll-cards/ [h 
ttps://perma.cc/2KNU-PXAP]. 
281. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CENTER, RATING STATE GOVERNMENT PAYROLL CARDS 3 (2015), 
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/payroll-card-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WY33-A8MW].  
282. Gregg Gelzinis et al., How Workers Get Paid Is Changing: Consumer Protections Need to 
Catch Up, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Jan. 17, 2019, 12:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issue 
s/economy/reports/2019/01/17/465223/workers-get-paid-changing-consumer-protections-need-catch/ [ 
https://perma.cc/DN9K-NJD5]. 
283. N.Y. STATE ATT’Y GEN., PINCHED BY PLASTIC: THE IMPACT OF PAYROLL CARDS ON LOW-
WAGE WORKERS 3 (2014), http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Pinched%20by%20Plastic.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
9EG4-9DVC].  
284. Oswalt & Marzán, supra note 208, at 453. 
285. Payroll cards do not bear interest, but given the typical rates in checking accounts, this 
concern is of little practical consequence. See Liran Haim & Ronald Mann, Putting Stored-Value Cards 
in Their Place, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 989, 1008 (2014). 












average per-employee fees were $5 to $11 per month.287 To make things 
worse, the fees are badly disclosed,288 among other concerns.289 
Federal legislation partially covers payroll cards. Under the Electronic 
Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) and Regulation E,290 financial institutions that 
offer payroll card accounts must make account information available to 
consumers by specific means, but they are exempted from providing 
periodic statements. 291  In addition, the financial institution must allow 
consumers to report errors and limit customers’ liability for unauthorized 
transfers.292 In April 2019, a new CFPB rule came into effect, expanding the 
fraud, error, and unauthorized charges protections to these cards; requiring 
simplified disclosure; and providing for easy access to information.293 State 
legislation in this area is developing. Roughly half of the states have some 
laws that regulate payroll cards.294 The regulations usually permit the use of 
these cards but impose some limits on fees and set rules on proper fee 
disclosure.295 Finally, a series of class actions were filed against employers 
who offered payroll card programs for failing to obtain employee consent 
and for violating wage and hour laws.296 In one of these cases, a court in 
Pennsylvania ruled that the mandatory use of pay cards that impose fees is 
illegal.297 
 
287. Stephanie M. Wilshusen et al., Consumers’ Use of Prepaid Cards: A Transaction-Based 
Analysis, FED. RES. BANK OF PHILADELPHIA 41 (Aug. 2012), https://www.fdic.gov/news/events/consum 
ersymposium/2013/papers/wilshusen.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ASE-96DR]. 
288. Haim & Mann, supra note 285, at 1014.  
289. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Stephanie Clifford, Paid Via Card, Workers Feel Sting of Fees, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/01/business/as-pay-cards-replace-payc 
hecks-bank-fees-hurt-workers.html [https://perma.cc/7D6C-T39D]. 
290. Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2018); Prepaid Accounts Under the 
Electronic Fund Transfer Act (Regulation E), 12 C.F.R. § 1005 (2018).  
291. FED. RESERVE, ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER ACT 18, https://www.federalreserve.gov/boar 
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292. FED. RESERVE, REGULATION E: ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER ACT 6 (2013), https://www.fe 
deralreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/efta.pdf [https://perma.cc/48JL-EHDY]. 
293. See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PREPAID ACCOUNTS UNDER THE 
ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER ACT (REGULATION E) AND THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT (REGULATION 
Z), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/20161005_cfpb_Final_Rule_Prepaid_Accounts.pdf 
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294. Rachel Blakely-Gray, Pay Card Laws by State and Regulations, PATRIOT SOFTWARE (June 
5, 2019), https://www.patriotsoftware.com/payroll/training/blog/pay-card-laws-by-state/ [https://perma. 
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295. See generally id. (surveying state laws); see also Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T. 
Middlebrook, Are These Game Changers? Developments in the Law Affecting Virtual Currencies, 
Prepaid Payroll Cards, Online Tribal Lending, and Payday Lenders, 70 BUS. LAW. 261, 265 (2014). 
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14, 16, 19, Branson v. Destiny Foods, Inc., No. D-1-GN-14-001131 (419th Judicial District Court of 
Travis County, Tex. May 13, 2014). 
297. See Siciliano v. Mueller, 149 A.3d 863 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016). 












Facilitating the use of payroll cards is an important step towards the 
abolition of the payday. The recent CFPB regulation offers an initial 
framework, safeguarding certain employee rights, although more 
experimentation is needed.298 Still, the fragmented nature of state legislation 
impedes much innovation. 299  Admittedly, it is difficult to design a fee 
structure that would make payroll cards profitable to operate and yet not 
encumber poor households with additional expenses. Still, others have made 
the case that increasing access to banking through public subsidies can be 
justified both as a matter of redistribution and efficiency.300  
Against this regulatory backdrop, positive steps can be taken to promote 
payroll cards, at least for an initial period of adoption, such as offering 
certain tax subsidies or requiring all employers to offer this option.  
A less obvious hurdle in the way of payroll cards is pro-employee 
regulation that mandates that employers offer the choice of payment 
methods. The Electronic Fund Transfer Act and Regulation E prohibit 
employers from forcing employees to receive wages via pay card.301 New 
York law requires employers to obtain advance written consent to pay 
employees with payroll cards. 302  This choice creates unanticipated 
problems: if, when setting a daily payday, employers must pay some 
employees in cash or check, this cost could be significant. Employee choice, 
then, can undermine the viability of payment streams.  
The solution, however, is straightforward. The daily pay option can be 
made open only to employees who are willing to use pay cards or bank 
transfers. Relative to today, where all employees are paid on long intervals, 
employees who favor cash will not be harmed by having this additional 
option. But for all other employees, this option would greatly advance their 
wellbeing.  
 
298. See Haim & Mann, supra note 285, at 1014–19. 
299. See Benjamin Lo, Fatal Fragments: The Effect of Money Transmission Regulation on 
Payments Innovation, 18 YALE J. L. & TECH. 111 (2016).  
300. Barr, supra note 209, at 237 (“[N]etwork externalities in electronic payments systems and 
distribution networks suggest that net social benefit could be obtained through further expansion.”). 
301. See Letter from Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, to Sen. Richard 
Blumenthal, Sen. Charles E. Schumer & Sen. Joe Manchin, III (Sept. 12, 2013), http://goo.gl/KOqFzB 
[https://perma.cc/3KCJ-2QSN]; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB BULLETIN 2013-10: PAYROLL 
CARD ACCOUNTS (REGULATION E) 1–2 (Sept. 12, 2013), http://goo.gl/98d8I6 [https://perma.cc/FM77-
RZJS]. 
302. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 191 (McKinney 2007). See also Letter from Maria L. Colavito & Jeffrey 














V. THE DAY AFTER PAYDAY: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
A complicated dynamic of dated legislation, path-dependence, and 
inefficient money technology has contributed to the economy-wide practice 
of paying employees in arrears. This dynamic puts employees in the absurd 
position of lending money to their employers.  
This feature of the modern economy is clearly a software problem, not a 
hardware problem. We can, and should, pay workers in at least the same 
frequency we pay overseas vendors. Instead, our antiquated system of 
payments creates significant financial stress, leading households to borrow 
from payday lenders and other providers of short-term credit products.  
Abolishing the payday might take time, as it will face resistance. No 
change is easy. However, the case for paying people for their work is too 
compelling to ignore. Paying employees late may have made sense when 
we had to compute wages by hand and carry coin chests between worksites. 
But it makes little sense when sending digital money has become so 
ubiquitous that our vocabulary includes new verbs to describe instantaneous 
money transfers—e.g., “I will Venmo you the money tomorrow,” and “I just 
Paypaled you.” 
With our new hardware, it is time to update our legal software. 
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